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Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third CountriesApril 2006
THE PUBLIC POLICY AND MANDATORY RULES OF THIRD
COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
ADELINE CHONG*
A. INTRODUCTION
While party autonomy has risen in the field of contract, this autonomy is not
unfettered. Parties are allowed to choose the governing law of the contract1 but
limitations on party choice can be seen through the operation of public policy
and mandatory rules. The public policy and mandatory rules of three laws may
be imposed onto the contract: that of the lex fori, the governing law of the
contract and the law of a third country2 with a connection to the contract. It is
generally accepted that the public policy and mandatory rules of the forum have
a legitimate role to play in the regulation of the contract.3 Some continental,
particularly German, theorists are more equivocal about whether the public
policy and mandatory rules of the governing law of the contract have a similar
legitimacy.4 Nevertheless, the most controversial issue with regard to restrictions
on party autonomy is whether the law of a third country is or should be given
effect. This issue is the focus of this article.
The current position under English law is that the laws of third countries are
not relevant owing to the reservation5 against Article 7(1) of the Rome Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.6 Germany, Luxembourg,
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 27
* Lecturer in Law, University of Nottingham. I would like to thank Prof. J. Fawcett and the editors
of this journal for helpful comments made on earlier drafts of this article. All errors remain my
own.
1 Article 3 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations; Vita Food
Products Inc. v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277.
2 Ie, one that is neither the governing law of the contract nor the law of the forum.
3 Articles 7(2) and 16 of the Rome Convention.
4 See N Voser, “Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International
Commercial Arbitration” (1996) 7 American Review of International Arbitration 319, 323. Cf. Max
Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, Comments on the European
Commission’s Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization (2004) Rabels Zeitschrift 1, 69; document
also accessible online at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_
public/rome_i/doc/max_planck_institute_foreign_private_international_law_en.pdf (as on 23
February 2006) (page references in this article refer to the RabelsZ text).
5 Section 2(2) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.
6 Hereafter the “Rome Convention”; enacted into English law by the Contracts (Applicable Law)
Act 1990.
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Portugal and Ireland have also chosen not to enact Article 7(1) into their laws.
However, the European Commission has recently published its proposal for a
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, commonly known
as the proposed Rome I Regulation.7 One of the most interesting implications of
this move to transpose the Rome Convention into a Regulation is that the
successor to Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention may form part of the law of
the United Kingdom and the other reserving States.8 If this development comes
to pass, should it be welcomed or resisted?
This article will first briefly consider the meaning of the two concepts of
public policy and mandatory rules. Next, the key question of whether a third
country’s public policy and mandatory rules should be relevant in an interna-
tional contract will be analysed. Case law regarding the relevance or otherwise of
the law of a third country often involves the law of the place of performance.
Hence, lastly, the role that is given to the lex loci solutionis will be examined to
discover principles of general application.
B. DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND MANDATORY RULES
The nature and operation of public policy and mandatory rules involve consider-
able intricacy and detailed expositions can be found elsewhere.9 The object of
this section is merely to give a general overview of these two concepts in order to
lay the background for the in-depth analysis of the various issues concerning the
laws of third countries that follows.
1. Public Policy
The concept of public policy has strong ethical associations. Cardozo J has put it
thus:
28 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
7 COM (2005) 650 final.
8 The draft Article 8(3). See also Article 13(2) of the amended proposal for a Regulation on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (commonly known as the proposed Rome II
Regulation) COM (2006) 83 final.
9 See, eg, PB Carter, “The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law” (1993) 42
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1; TC Hartley, “Mandatory Rules in International
Contracts: The Common Law Approach” (1997) 266 Recueil des Cours 341; F Mosconi,
“Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of Law Rules” (1989-V) Recueil des Cours 19; F Vischer,
“General Course on Private International Law” (1992-I) Recueil des Cours 21; D Jackson,
“Mandatory Rules and Rules of ‘Ordre Public’” in PM North (ed), Contract Conflicts: The EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations – A Comparative Study (Oxford, North-
Holland Publishing Co, 1982) (hereafter Contract Conflicts); S Knofel, “Mandatory Rules and
Choice of Law: A Comparative Approach to Article 7(2) of the Rome Convention” [1999] Journal
of Business Law 239; N Enonchong, “Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws: A Chinese Wall Around
Little England?” (1995) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 633; A Briggs, “Public Policy
in the Conflict of Laws: A Sword and a Shield?” (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and
Comparative Law 953.
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“The courts are not free to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit
the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the commonweal.”10
One generally speaks of forum public policy in relation to an international
contract. However, in certain situations it appears that the public policy of a
third country is relevant. This issue will be examined below.11 For now, however,
the focus will be on the more familiar idea of forum public policy in order to
sketch out how the concept of “public policy” operates.12
There are two tiers of public policy: public policy that is applicable in a
domestic context and public policy that is applicable even in an international
context.13 French civil lawyers use the phrases “ordre public interne” and “ordre
public externe” respectively. It has been observed that the phrase “ordre public”
has “a far less political connotation”14 and “deeper roots”15 than the parallel
English phrase “public policy”, and it is the wider civil law sense of the concept
that is applicable in international conventions. The English text of the Hague
Conventions as well as Article 16 of the Rome Convention includes the phrase
“ordre public” to denote this fact.16 However, there are no indications that the
wider civil law sense of the concept is causing English courts any difficulty. In
addition, in the field of contractual obligations, a comparative study between the
French and English legal systems indicates that there is a “considerable simi-
larity” between the French courts’ approach and that of the English courts in the
application of public policy.17 Thus the practical differences between the civil
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 29
10 Loucks v Standard Oil Co 120 NE 198 at 202 (1918).
11 Section D.2.
12 Public policy is a tenuous concept and as Vischer notes, “All attempts to establish a precise
definition of the content of ordre public must fail. We cannot do more than indicate some general
directions”: supra n 9, 100–01.
13 Domestic and international public policy are two aspects of the same thing in that both express
the fundamental values of the forum; only their spheres of application differ: AN Zhilsov,
“Mandatory and Public Policy Rules in International Commercial Arbitration” (1995) Netherlands
International Law Review 81, 97. O Kahn-Freund argues that courts appear more keen to ascribe an
ordre public international character to judge-made law than to statutes: Selected Writings (London,
Stevens & Sons, 1978), 254.
14 RH Graveson, The Conflict of Laws (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 7th edn, 1974), 165; quoted by
Mosconi, supra n 9, 24.
15 Mosconi, supra n 9, 24.
16 A Diamond, “Harmonization of Private International Law Relating to Contractual Obligations”
(1986) 199 Recueil des Cours 233, 292.
17 FH Lawson, AE Anton, L Neville Brown, Amos and Walton’s Introduction to French Law (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 3rd edn, 1967), 169. The main differences are that French courts frequently use
French statutes as a source of public policy since French law is primarily statutory in character
and they put emphasis on subjective rights and standards as opposed to the common law
predilection for objective standards: D Lloyd, Public Policy: A Comparative Study in English and French
Law (London, The Athlone Press, 1953), 7, 150. Cf HC Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An
Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study & Research (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn,
1949), 98–100.
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and common law concepts of public policy appear not to be of great relevance in
international contracts.
Public policy comes into play at the last stage of the conflicts process, after
operation of choice of law rules has identified the governing law. Forum sover-
eignty provides this “escape route”,18 in the sense that the forum is not obliged to
give effect to foreign provisions which are against its principles. Indeed, it has
been pointed out that if the forum were to recognize such foreign values, this:
“would give rise, within itself, to profound contradictions much more dangerous than
simple public disorders. It would potentially be able to stir up a situation of continuing
conflict; in other words, that system would end up by negating its very essence of legal
order.”19
Under the common law, forum public policy operates under two heads: first,
rejection of a foreign rule that is repugnant to English public policy;20 and
secondly, public policy that aims to maintain comity between the United
Kingdom and other nations.21 The operation of the first head is straightforward
and is based on the idea of forum sovereignty mentioned above. The operation
of the second head is more problematic as it has a bearing upon the interrela-
tionship between public policy and mandatory rules. This issue will shortly be
discussed in detail.22
Under the Rome Convention, Article 16 provides that:
“The application of a rule of the law of any country specified by this Convention may
be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy
(‘ordre public’) of the forum.”
Dicey and Morris observe that Article 16 is “precisely the same as the pre-existing
English law in relation to contracts”.23 This may be true only in relation to the
operation of the first head of public policy under the common law.24
30 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
18 Carter, supra n 9, 1.
19 N Palaia, L’ordine pubblico “internazionale” (Padua, CEDAM, 1974), 53; cited by Mosconi, supra n 9,
29.
20 Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 KB 591; Oppenheimer v Catermole [1976] AC 249; Rousillon v Rousillon
(1880) 14 Ch D 351; Grell v Levy (1864) 16 CB (NS) 73.
21 Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 K.B. 470; Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] AC 301. See L Collins, “Comity in
Modern Private International Law” in J Fawcett (ed), Reform and Development of Private International
Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford University Press, 2002), who probes the underlying
basis of the doctrine of comity in modern private international law.
22 Section B.3.
23 Save for the inclusion of the phrase “manifestly incompatible”: Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of
Laws (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 13th edn, 2000) (hereafter “Dicey and Morris”), 1277 (para
32–229). However, their statement as to the consistency between the common law and the Rome
Convention must be read subject to their interpretation of Foster v Driscoll. See infra, n 45.
24 See discussion infra section B.3.
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2. Mandatory Rules
Mandatory rules are imperative rules which apply to a contract irrespective of
the parties’ wishes. Nygh notes that the purpose of mandatory rules is twofold: to
protect the interests of the State itself and to protect private interests that the
State wishes to protect.25 The increasing importance of mandatory rules can be
attributed to the rejection of the idea that the governing law has to have some
connection with the contract; mandatory rules now function as a tool to restrict
party choice.26
The fundamental definition of mandatory rules is rules that cannot be
“excluded, altered or limited by contract”.27 However, two types of mandatory
rules must be distinguished. One is a type of mandatory rule which would be
applicable when the governing law of the contract is also that of the law
containing that particular mandatory rule. This category is known as domestic
mandatory rules. They are mainly concerned with the creation of a coherent
system of contract law; rules on offer and acceptance would be an example.28
The second category encompasses a narrower, “stronger” category of rules
which are applicable irrespective of the governing law of the contract. These are
known as international mandatory rules or overriding mandatory rules. They
have been defined by the European Court of Justice as being:
“national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the
protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member State concerned as
to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of that
Member State and all legal relationships within that State.”29
Typical examples are rules concerning exchange regulations, antitrust laws,
and import and export prohibitions.30 Under English law, an example of an
international mandatory rule is section 27(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977, which states that the Act applies to a contract notwithstanding a choice of
a foreign law if (a) the foreign law was chosen “wholly or mainly for the purpose
of enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of this Act”; or (b) “in
the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he was then
habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the essential steps necessary for
the making of the contract were taken there, whether by him or by others on his
behalf.”
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 31
25 P Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999), 203.
26 Voser, supra n 4, 320.
27 Hartley, supra n 9, 345.
28 Ibid, 345–46.
29 Arblade (Case C–369/96) and Leloup (Case C–376/96) [1999] ECR I–8453, para 30. This passage
formed the inspiration for the European Commission’s definition of international mandatory
provisions in Article 8(1) of the proposed Rome I Regulation: COM (2005) 650 final, 8.
30 Vischer, supra n 9, 157; Voser, supra n 4, 325.
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However, identifying a mandatory rule as being either domestic or interna-
tional in nature is not always an easy task. Statutes do not always set out their
scope of application,31 and common law mandatory rules are hard to define.32 It
is clear, though, that the law of the country from which a mandatory rule origi-
nates determines whether or not it is mandatory in the domestic sense or
narrower, international sense.33
Both types of mandatory rules can be found in the Rome Convention.34 Arti-
cles 3(3), 5(2)35 and 6(1) concern domestic mandatory rules while Articles 7(1)
and 7(2) refer to international mandatory rules. Article 7(2) concerns the applica-
tion of the international mandatory rules of the forum while the other provisions
relate to the application of the mandatory rules of third states. These latter provi-
sions, and their counterparts in the proposed Rome I Regulation, will therefore
be looked at in more detail below.36
3. Interrelationship Between Public Policy and Mandatory Rules
Even though public policy and mandatory rules form two different concepts,
there is a fair amount of overlap between them. It is rightly said that mandatory
rules are, in a sense, an expression of public policy37 as the values which manda-
tory rules aim to promote are often of a public policy nature.38 The generally
accepted dividing line between the two is that public policy operates negatively
in that it involves the disapplication of the relevant applicable law,39 while
mandatory rules operate positively in that they are superimposed onto the appli-
cable law of the contract. However, the distinction between the two concepts is
sometimes not clear cut in practice. Kahn-Freund has argued that there is a
32 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
31 Apart from the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, other English statutes which have provisions
delineating their scope include the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act 1971. However, it has been observed that there seems to be a tendency to treat statutory
rules as being of international application: Kahn-Freund, supra n 13, 250–51; Jackson, supra n 9,
61.
32 Common law mandatory rules are noted to be difficult to identify in practice by PM North and JJ
Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (London, Butterworths, 13th edn, 1999), 582
(hereafter “Cheshire and North”); but they are by no means non-existent. The word “loi” was
replaced by the word “droit” in the French text of Article 7(1) to make it clear that the provision
covered both mandatory legislative provisions and mandatory common law rules: M Giuliano
and P Lagarde, “Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations”
(1980) OJ C282, 27 (hereafter the “Giuliano–Lagarde Report”).
33 CMV Clarkson and J Hill, Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws (London, Butterworths, 2nd edn, 2002), 225
(hereafter “Jaffey”).
34 It has been remarked that the language used in the English version of the Convention draws the
distinction between these two categories of mandatory rules rather inelegantly: Jaffey, ibid.
35 Article 5 has been substantially altered in the proposed Rome I Regulation and is no longer
phrased in terms of mandatory rules. See below, section C.3(c)i.
36 Infra, section C.3(c).
37 Nygh, supra n 25, 206.
38 Zhilsov, supra n 13, 88.
39 Eg, Article 16 of the Rome Convention.
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phenomenon whereby public-policy-based decisions undergo a “premature
crystallisation” into independent rules and therefore lose the connection with
their flexible public policy roots.40 Numerous writers have articulated the argu-
ment that public policy sometimes applies in a positive fashion.41 That argument,
however, is more concerned with the issue whether the public policy of the lex fori
has led to the positive application of the mandatory rules of the lex fori. The more
pertinent issue for the purposes of this article is whether or not the positive appli-
cation of the mandatory rules of the law of a third country occurs under the
guise of forum public policy. Two English cases are oft cited in this regard.
Foster v Driscoll 42 involved an English contract to smuggle alcohol into the
United States during Prohibition. The illegal performance had not been carried
out and the parties had a fall-back plan to land the alcohol lawfully in Canada or
some other appropriate place where a third party would thereupon smuggle it
into the United States.43 However, a majority of the Court of Appeal held that
the contract was contrary to public policy and void. In Regazzoni v KC Sethia,44 the
contract, which was also governed by English law, was for the sale and delivery
of jute bags to Genoa. Although it was not mentioned in the contract, both
parties were aware that the jute could only be obtained from India and that the
buyer intended it for resale in South Africa. The export of jute from India to
South Africa was prohibited by Indian law. The House of Lords held that the
contract was unenforceable because an English court would not enforce a
contract, or award damages for its breach, if its performance involved the doing
of an act in a foreign and friendly state which was illegal under the law of that
State.
It must be noted that even though the above two cases concerned contracts
governed by English law, it is generally accepted that the courts would have had
no hesitation in striking them down even if they were governed by a foreign
law.45 Carter suggests that this is so because the principal consideration here is to
protect the national or international interests of the United Kingdom; the iden-
tity of the lex causae is therefore not relevant.46
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 33
40 Supra n 13, 238–48.
41 S Lee, “Restitution, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws” (1998) 20 University of Queensland Law
Journal 1, 4–6; Mosconi, supra n 9, 127; Zhilsov, supra n 13, 95; Hartley, supra n 9, 350–53;
M Forde, “The ‘Ordre Public’ Exception and Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions” (1980) 29
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 259, 260.
42 [1929] 1 KB 470 (hereafter “Foster”).
43 Scrutton LJ dissented on this ground.
44 [1958] AC 301 (hereafter “Regazzoni”).
45 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 585 (footnote 16); Jaffey, supra n 33, 250; Hartley, supra n 9, 353–54;
PB Carter, “Rejection of Foreign Law: Some Private International Law Inhibitions” (1984) 55
British Yearbook of International Law111, 125. Dicey and Morris rather inconsistently state that the rule
in Foster is not a conflicts rule but a rule of English domestic law, albeit one which the authors
think applies even if the contract is governed by foreign law: supra n 23, 1282 (para 32–238).
46 Supra n 45, 125.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
2:5
1 1
0 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
The contentious issue with respect to these two cases is whether the decisions
are based on the application of forum public policy or the foreign mandatory
rule. It is contentious because the answer determines whether this line of cases
survives the Rome Convention. The emphasis in the judgments47 is very much
on the concept of comity and the need to preserve good relations with a friendly
foreign state.48 For example, in Regazzoni, Viscount Simonds held that:
“Just as public policy avoids contracts which offend against our own law, so it will avoid
at least some contracts which violate the laws of a foreign State, and it will do so
because public policy demands that deference to international comity.”49
In Foster v Driscoll, Lawrence LJ thought that recognition by the Court of
Appeal of the contract would:
“furnish a just cause for complaint by the United States Government against our Gov-
ernment . . . and would be contrary to our obligation of international comity as now
understood and recognized, and therefore would offend against our notions of public
morality.”50
This may lead one to surmise that the cases concerned English public policy,
specifically application of the second head of public policy that aims to maintain
comity between the United Kingdom and other nations. Yet the effect of the
decisions is that the United States and Indian mandatory rules were ultimately
applied by the English courts.51 A foreign law that was considered to be “of the
utmost importance to that foreign country” was applied to strike down the
contract.52 This then looks like a case where the English courts gave indirect
effect to the mandatory rules of a third country under the guise of applying
English public policy. If this is correct, the cases do not fall within Article 16 of
the Rome Convention as that envisages a negative operation of public policy.53
34 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
47 See especially, Regazzoni [1958] AC 301, 318–19 (Viscount Simonds), 323, 324 (Lord Reid), 327
(Lord Keith), 330 (Lord Somervell); Foster [1929] 1 KB 470, 510 (Lawrence LJ), 519, 521 (Sankey
LJ). See also Nygh, supra n 25, 224–25.
48 For the difficulty in identifying a friendly foreign state and having to take sides between two such
states, see FA Mann, “Illegality and the Conflict of Laws” (1958) 21 Modern Law Review 130, 133;
FMB Reynolds, “The Enforcement of Contracts Involving Corruption or Illegality in Other
Countries” [1997] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 371, 379, 387–88.
49 [1958] AC 301, 319.
50 [1929] 1 KB 470, 510.
51 Mann, supra n 48, 133–34; J Harris, “Contractual Freedom in the Conflict of Laws” (2000) 20
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 247, 262 (footnote 78).
52 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 586.
53 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 585; Hartley, supra n 9, 403; J Hill, International Commercial Disputes
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 3rd edn, 2005), 525 (para 14.4.38). The cases could come under Article
16 only if it is possible to construe the phrase “rule of law” as meaning “the notional, unexpressed
rule of the applicable law, according to which the contract is not illegal or invalid”: P Kaye,
The New Private International Law of Contract of the European Community: Implementation of the EEC’s
Contractual Obligations Convention in England and Wales under the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990
(Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, 1993), 347 (emphasis in original). This is obviously strained
reasoning which is better not pursued.
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Instead, it is thought that Article 7(1), which permits a court to apply the inter-
national mandatory rules of a third country, encapsulates the situation that arose
in those cases.54 Article 7(1), however, is not part of the law of the United
Kingdom and therefore this line of cases must be considered not to survive the
Rome Convention.55
The debate as to whether Foster and Regazzoni continue to be applicable under
the Rome Convention may shortly become redundant. In the proposed Rome I
Regulation,56 Article 7(1) is transposed as the new Article 8(3). It may be the case
that Article 8(3) is discarded or amended in the final version. However, if Article
8(3) survives, Foster and Regazzoni will stand under the future Rome I Regulation
as English courts will acquire the discretion to apply a third country’s mandatory
rules. The question as to whether this would be something to be welcomed or
not is the object of the next section.
C. LAW OF A THIRD COUNTRY
This section will commence with a principled examination of whether the law of
a third country should be given effect in an international contract. Next, the
methods by which a third country’s laws can be given effect will be investigated.
This will be followed by an analysis of instances where a third country’s laws are
given effect in case law, international conventions and national laws, with a
particular focus on the Rome Convention.
1. Considerations of Principle
Why should the forum bother giving effect to another country’s public policy
and mandatory rules if that country is not the lex causae? Two reasons may be put
forward: the interest of the third country in having its law applied and comity.
(a) The Interest of the Third Country in Having its Law Applied
The third country may have an interest in having its public policy or mandatory
rules applied in a case heard in another forum. As Kaye argues:
“International contracts cannot be isolated within a conceptual vacuum . . . the fact
that they have effects in other countries, which may be vitally important for the parties
or those countries themselves . . . cannot simply be ignored”57
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 35
54 Hartley, supra n 9, 403; Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 586.
55 Cf P Stone, Conflict of Laws (London, Longman, 1995), 258; D Lasok and PA Stone, Conflict of
Laws in the European Community (Abingdon, Professional Books, 1987), 373. The argument that the
cases survive the Rome Convention via Article 7(2) is considered infra, text to nn 222–24.
56 COM (2005) 650 final.
57 Supra n 53, 256. Vischer, supra n 12, 175, would add the proviso that a foreign state’s interest
should only be taken into account where it is congruent with the interests of the forum.
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The recognition of this third state’s interest by the forum is based on the idea of
governmental interest analysis. This stems primarily from Currie’s thesis, the gist
of which is that:
“The application of foreign law is justified when that law expresses a policy of the for-
eign state, when the connections of the case with the foreign state are such as to give it
a legitimate interest in having its policy applied, and when there is no conflicting inter-
est of the forum state.”58
Interest analysis has its fair share of critics. It has been argued that construing
a legislature’s intent is a futile process as the extent of the intended territorial
reach of a rule will often not be articulated or even considered.59 This applies a
fortiori when a court is trying to discern a foreign state’s intentions. However, the
court’s task may not be as difficult as it may seem as it will not be considering the
foreign rule without some assistance. As Jackson notes, it will be for the party
alleging application of a particular foreign mandatory rule to persuade the court
that the rule should be applied in the situation before it.60 Another criticism is
that governmental interest is only relevant to public law, not private law
matters.61 This has been refuted by Vischer who points out that governmental
interests would include safeguarding the public interest as well as balancing
private interests.62 Furthermore, critics argue that the doctrine focuses on a
state’s interest at the expense of parties’ interests.63 However, this last objection
falters in relation to a mandatory rule because as Hartley points out, “mandatory
rules are the fruit of specific policies, and those policies are regarded as being of
such importance that they override the interests of the parties.”64
The influence of Currie’s ideas in the area of choice of law for contract can
be seen in section 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (2nd) of Conflict of Laws and Article
19(1) of the Swiss Private International Law Statute 1987.65 Article 7(1) of the
Rome Convention also has its roots in interest analysis66 and this underlying basis
is made more overt in Article 8(3) of the proposed Rome I Regulation. A court,
36 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
58 B Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1963), 48.
59 Hartley, supra n 9, 364; A Bonomi, “Mandatory Rules in Private International Law: The quest for
uniformity of decisions in a global environment” in P Šarčević and P Volken, Yearbook of Private
International Law (Vol. I) (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999), 231 (footnote 54).
60 Supra n 9, 75.
61 K Zweigert, “Some Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private International Law or
What is Justice in Conflict of Laws?” (1973) 44 University of Colorado Law Review 283, 288;
A Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on Conflict of Laws (St Paul, West, 1962), 63. Both cited in Vischer, supra
n 9, 54–55.
62 Vischer, supra n 9, 55.
63 Ibid.
64 Hartley, supra n 9, 364.
65 See infra, section C.3(b).
66 P Lagarde, “The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations:
An Apologia” (1981) 22 Virginia Journal of International Law 91, 103; CGJ Morse, “The EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations” (1982) 2 Yearbook of European Law
107, 146; Stone, supra n 55, 261.
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in considering whether to give effect to the third State’s mandatory rules, “shall
have regard to their nature and purpose . . . and to the consequences of their
application or non-application for the objective pursued by the relevant manda-
tory rules and for the parties.”67
(b) Comity
It has been seen above that there is a recognition in some quarters that the third
country has a legitimate interest in having its laws applied. The question then is:
why should the forum defer to such interests? The oft-cited reason is comity. This
is an elusive concept but has at its heart application of foreign law and recog-
nition of foreign acts68 owing to “considerations of justice and of the mutual
convenience of states.”69 Comity has been criticised but arguably the criticisms70
have more to do with the imprecise and inconsistent use of the word rather than
the doctrine of comity itself. However, Wolff argues that:
“The doctrine is erroneous because it is based on the idea that any state has an interest
in the application of its law by the courts of other states. Suppose that the true proper
law of a contract concluded in Italy between two Frenchmen is Italian law, but that the
English court which entertains an action arising out of that contract wrongly holds that
French law applies and therefore dismisses the action – then it is only the plaintiff who
suffers – the Italian state is indifferent.”71
That may be so when one is speaking of the situation above where a faulty
application of English choice of law rules has led to the non-application of
Italian domestic law, but it is submitted that if one were considering Italian inter-
national mandatory rules, that would be a different matter. The mere fact that
Italy has chosen to make a rule of theirs applicable in international situations
irrespective of the governing law of the contract surely indicates that it is a rule
which is of some importance to it such that it would hardly be indifferent should
that particular international mandatory rule be ignored by the English court.
As Drobnig observes, “states should mutually pay regard for each other’s
interests”.72 Several reasons, based on or derived from the concept of comity,
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 37
67 Morse, supra n 66, 146, observes in relation to Article 7(1) that: “It is paradoxical that a method of
analysis so often criticised by Europeans as being subjective [footnote reference omitted] should
find its way into a European Convention on choice of law in contracts.”
68 M Wolff, Private International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1950), 14–15. Cheshire and
North point out that if “comity” were to be given its normal meaning, ie “acts of courtesy”, this
would not explain why English courts apply enemy law in times of war: supra n 32, 5. Wolff points
out that Germany did not forbid application of English law during the war as well: 15.
69 GC Cheshire, Private International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935), 6; quoted by Collins, supra
n 21, 104.
70 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 5; Wolff, supra n 68, 14–15;
71 Wolff, supra n 68, 15.
72 O Lando, B von Hoffman and K Siehr (eds), European Private International Law of Obligations
(Tübingen, Mohr, 1975), 83; cited by FA Mann, “Contracts: Effects of Mandatory Rules” in
K Lipstein (ed), Harmonisation of Private International Law by the EEC (London, Institute of Advanced
Legal Studies/University of London, 1978), 35.
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may be advanced in relation to this position. First, there is the motivation to
preserve relations with friendly foreign states.73 This reason has been criticised on
the ground that it is sovereigns and not courts who have the task of maintaining
foreign relations74 and the idea of the separation of powers in this regard appears
to be strictly enforced in continental Europe.75
Secondly, the spirit of internationalism comes into play in that there is a need
to foster international co-operation. As has been recognised:
“no nation can expect its laws to reach further than its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudi-
cate, and enforce. Every nation must often rely on other countries to help it achieve its
regulatory expectations. Thus, comity compels national courts to act at all times to
increase the international legal ties that advance the rule of law with and among
nations.”76
This is obviously an important consideration in today’s age where States are
more socially and economically interdependent than ever before. It applies a
fortiori if the rationale underlying the relevant foreign mandatory rule or public
policy is one which is shared by the forum77 or could be said to be in the
“common interest of the international community of States.”78
Thirdly, there could be an element of self-interest in giving deference to
another State’s mandatory laws and public policy. In another context, Kramer
has observed that enforcing foreign law is better than always enforcing forum law
because “it invites reciprocal action that advances forum policies in cases
brought elsewhere.”79 Thus, the willingness of a court to give effect to a third
State’s mandatory rules and public policy in situations where it is not obliged to
do so80 might encourage similar reciprocal action by foreign courts.81
Fourthly, giving effect to a third state’s laws would ameliorate the problem of
forum shopping and help lead towards uniformity of decisions. Although harmo-
nisation of choice of law and jurisdictional rules work in tandem to achieve the
twin objects of deterring forum shopping and achieving uniformity of decisions,
loopholes remain. For example, under the Brussels I Regulation on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
38 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
73 Foster [1929] 1 KB 470; Regazzoni [1958] AC 301.
74 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 5.
75 Bonomi, supra n 59, 238.
76 Laker Airways Ltd v Sabena Belgian Airlines 731 F 2d 909 at 937 (DC Cir 1984), per Judge Wilkey.
77 Bonomi, supra n 59, 238; Hartley, supra n 9, 365.
78 Bonomi, supra n 59, 238.
79 L Kramer, “Return to Renvoi” (1991) 66 New York Law Review 979, 1016; quoted by Bonomi, supra
n 59, 238.
80 Because the third State is not the lex causae.
81 This is not, however, to say that reciprocity should be a precondition of the invocation of the
doctrine of comity. This would be a narrow-minded line of thinking which raises the danger of
wealthier and stronger nations imposing their will upon other nations. It would fall foul of what
Mann condemns as “the supremacy of the most ambitious and most political of States . . . the
submission of the moderate to the extreme”: supra n 72, 35.
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Matters,82 Article 27 forbids the court of a Member State from proceeding with a
case involving the same parties and same cause of action which has already been
brought in the court of another Member State. Speed is imperative and the “first
come, first served” approach means that the outcome of the case could depend
on which party is quicker to bring his claim in his favoured forum. Bonomi
argues that “In this context, it is not reasonable – and it can be very unjust – to
ignore the mandatory rules of another contracting State where, under the same
circumstances, the proceedings could have taken place.”83 This observation
applies as well to the fact that more than one fora may be available under the
Brussels I Regulation.84 In addition, as matters now stand, inconsistency exists
within the Member States of the European Community due to the reservation
entered against Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention by the United Kingdom,85
Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Ireland. Of course, it could be argued that
since, first, Article 7(1) gives the court a discretion and does not oblige the court
to apply the third State’s mandatory rules; and secondly, the circumstances under
which a third State’s laws could be said to be relevant under this provision are
not clearly delineated, uniformity does not seem to be a good possibility even if
all Member States were to enact Article 7(1). However, the potential for unifor-
mity would be higher if it were enacted across the board. This is because the
European Court of Justice would be able to give guidance as to how Article 7(1)
should operate and thus a third country’s mandatory rules would be taken into
account in a consistent manner in all Member States. Whereas as things now
stand, countries that have not enacted Article 7(1) are left to their own devices as
to when and in what manner a third country’s laws would be relevant. This ad
hoc approach towards the consideration of foreign interests results in unpredict-
ability and uncertainty.86
Fifthly, in view of the fact that most, if not all, legal systems recognise and
enforce foreign judgments, “it does not seem sensible to exclude the direct appli-
cation of [foreign mandatory] rules, when one considers that they could have
effect indirectly in the forum through the recognition of a decision handed down
in the foreign country.”87 This point is bolstered by the fact that the European
regime on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is becoming
increasingly automatic. A judgment given in a Member State is to be recognised
in another Member State without any special procedure88 and furthermore, a
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 39
82 Hereafter the Brussels I Regulation.
83 Supra n 59, 240.
84 This is one of the justifications put forward by the European Commission for Article 8(3) of the
draft Rome I Regulation; see COM (2005) 650 final, 9.
85 Section 2(2) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.
86 “Note – Article 7(1) of the European Contracts Convention: Codifying the Practice of Applying
Foreign Mandatory Rules” (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 2462, 2474–75.
87 Bonomi, supra n 59, 240.
88 Article 33 of the Brussels I Regulation. See also Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for
uncontested claims (2004) OJ L143/15.
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judgment cannot be reviewed as to its substance.89 This means that indirect
application of a third country’s laws is a customary occurrence under the recog-
nition and enforcement provisions.90 This is in addition to the indirect effect that
is given to the law of a third country via the governing law of the contract or the
lex fori, an issue that will be looked at below.91
Sixthly, there is perhaps the simplest and strongest reason of all – to do justice
between the parties. This is the case where a particular contracted-for act has
subsequently become illegal according to the law of the place of performance; in
this situation, would the court enforce the contract and thereby expose the party
who has to carry out the illegal performance to sanctions in the place of perfor-
mance?92 Surely justice and legitimate party expectations in this scenario would
be that the contract would not be enforced.93
Thus, it can be seen from the above that the concept of comity and deriva-
tions from this concept reveal several strong reasons why a court should give
effect to a third country’s public policy and mandatory rules.
2. Modes of Application of the Third Country’s Laws: Indirect and
Direct Application
Having established above that there is a case for arguing that a third state’s
public policy and mandatory rules should be applied by a court as a recognition
of the third country’s legitimate interest in a particular issue and on grounds of
comity,94 the next issue concerns the mode in which the third country’s law
should be given effect. One could give effect to the third country’s laws indirectly
or directly. The availability of two modes of applying a third country’s laws is
expressly recognised in Germany which has developed the concepts of Schuld-
statuttheorie and Sonderanknüpfungstheorie respectively.95
40 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
89 Article 45(2) of the Brussels I Regulation.
90 Admittedly there is a conceptual difference between having to recognise and enforce a decision
handed down by another court and having to decide which laws are applicable as the court first
seised of a case. However, at the end of the day, a third country’s laws are ultimately given effect
by the forum in the former situation.
91 Section C.2(a).
92 The case in point is Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287. However, Ralli Bros
has been interpreted as a case concerning the application of a rule of English domestic law of
contract as the proper law of the contract was English law. See infra, section D.1.
93 See s 2.615(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code which states that: “Delay in delivery or non-
delivery by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as
agreed has been made impracticable by . . . compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign
or domestic governmental regulation or order.”
94 Cf J Harris, “Does Choice of Law Make Any Sense?” Current Legal Problems (Oxford University
Press, 2004), 348.
95 Voser, supra n 4, 323–24; Vischer, supra n 9, 168.
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(a) Indirect Application
The German concept of Schuldstatuttheorie describes the traditional method under
which the third country’s laws are taken into account as a factor within the app-
lication of the lex causae. Voser claims that this indirect method has “found
application in all legal systems”.96 In Kulturgüterfall,97 illegally exported Nigerian
cultural goods were damaged during their transport from Nigeria to Hamburg.
The insurance contract was governed by German law. The German Bundes-
gerichtshof applied the concept of Schuldstatuttheorie and held that the evasion of the
Nigerian law was an immoral act under section 138 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
(German Civil Code).98 Thus, Nigerian law was not applied directly, but only
through the aegis of the governing law of the contract, ie German law.99
In England, the indirect mode of application involves not just the consider-
ation of the third country’s laws as a factor by the governing law of the
contract100 but also by the lex fori. In Regazzoni v KC Sethia,101 it was English public
policy, acting as forum public policy, which took note of the fact that the contract
involved performance which would have breached an Indian mandatory rule.
The Indian mandatory rule was not applied per se;102 the contract was unenforce-
able because it was against English public policy to enforce contracts that
involved the performance of an illegal act according to the laws of a friendly
foreign state.103 This is an example of a third country’s mandatory rule being
taken into account to the extent that it is relevant under the lex fori. Swiss courts
also appear to allow indirect application via the lex fori; they construe illegality by
a third state’s law as contravening Swiss notions of morality.104
However, critics of this indirect mode of application have pointed out that at
the end of the day it is the third country’s laws which are given effect. In relation
to the Kulturgüterfall,105 Vischer observes that the question of immorality under
German law only arose because of the Nigerian prohibition. “What the German
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 41
96 Voser, supra n 4, 323.
97 BGH, 22 June 1972; BGHZ 59, 82; discussed by Vischer, supra n 9, 170.
98 Cf Mayer who argues that it cannot be immoral to fail to respect a law which is inapplicable:
cited by D Hochistrasser, “Choice of Law and ‘Foreign’ Mandatory Rules in International
Arbitration” (1994) 57 Journal of International Arbitration 57, 71.
99 The interest of the third country must be considered legitimate by German standards: Vischer,
supra n 9, 171. See (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 2462, 2471 for more examples of German case
law which took account of a third country’s mandatory rules.
100 Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287.
101 [1958] AC 301; facts supra text to n 44.
102 The same interpretation is adopted by Nygh, supra n 25, 224–25. Cf Cheshire and North, supra n 32,
586; Harris, supra n 51, 262 (footnote 78).
103 See [1958] AC 301, 324, per Lord Reid: “this case does not, in my view, involve the enforcement
of Indian law in England. In fact, no breach of Indian law in the execution of this contract was
ever committed or attempted because the contract came to an end by its repudiation by the
respondents within a few days after it was made”.
104 Hochistrasser, supra n 98, 72.
105 BGH, 22 June 1972; BGHZ 59, 82.
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courts did, in fact, was to implement the foreign legislative policy when it was
regarded as justified under German law.”106 The same point could also be made
in relation to Regazzoni.107 Despite the emphasis in the judgments on the basis of
the decision being application of forum public policy, the end result was that the
Indian mandatory rule was given effect.
Given that it appears that the same result ensues whether one directly applies
the third state’s laws or indirectly applies it within the confines of the governing
law of the contract or public policy of the forum, is it necessary to examine which
mode represents the best method? The answer is “yes”. First, the same result
may not always be achieved under both modes. As Voser points out, the oppor-
tunity for indirect application depends on whether or not there are “possibilities
of consideration existing within the applicable law”108 such as impossibility,
immorality or illegality.109 Secondly, the broader reason of having legal principles
clearly articulated can only be of benefit to the overall running of a legal system.
Thus, the alternative mode of direct application of the third country’s laws will
next be examined in order to gauge which of the two modes is preferable.
(b) Direct application
The method of direct application of a third country’s laws is self-explanatory. It
is thought that its origin lies with the German concept of Sonderanknüpfungs-
theorie110 or “Special Connection” approach.111 This involves the direct applica-
tion of foreign public laws which affect private legal relationships, usually those
involving export control and import or export restrictions, upon examination of
their scope and purpose. As such, it has close ties with Currie’s governmental
interest analysis whereby rules are functionally analysed.
As has been seen above, if it is the third country’s laws which are ultimately
given effect in cases like Kulturgüterfall,112 Regazzoni v KC Sethia113 and similar cases,
recognition of direct applicability could represent a more honest way forward.
This is the position of Mayer, who argues that the authority of the third state’s
42 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
106 Vischer, supra n 12, 171, citing C von Bar, Internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 1, ‘Allgemeine Lehren’
(Munich, C H Beck, 1987), n 265. Cf K Siehr, “International Art Trade and the Law” (1993-VI)
243 Recueil des Cours 9, 52–53, 190–91; cited by Nygh, supra n 25, 225.
107 [1958] AC 301.
108 One may add here, or lex fori.
109 Supra n 4, 343.
110 Translated into “Sonderstatut Theory” in English academic writings: Nordic Group for Private
International Law, Proposal for Amendments to the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 46 (footnote 120); document accessible online at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/nordic_group_private_international_law_
en.pdf (as on 23 February 2006); R Plender, The European Contracts Convention: The Rome Convention on
Choice of Law for Contracts (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edn, 2001), 184 (para 9–02); Mann,
supra n 72, 32.
111 Dicey and Morris, supra n 23, 1245 (para 32–138).
112 BGH, 22 June 1972; BGHZ 59, 82.
113 [1958] AC 301.
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mandatory rule must be explicitly acknowledged if it is used to annul a contract;
it is not sufficient to take it into account indirectly.114
A question arises: must the third country be the country of closest connection
or would it suffice if it has a close or significant connection with the contract
before its laws can be taken into account? It is submitted that the latter suffices.
Of course, the public policy and mandatory rules of the law of closest connection
would be a prime candidate for being taken into account. However, other third
countries’ laws which may not be the law of closest connection may have just as
strong an interest as, or an even stronger interest than, the objective governing
law. An example would be if the contract involves performance of an act in a
third country which is illegal according to that country’s laws, this third country
not being the objective governing law.115 Objections that the criterion of “close
connection” is too vague can be countered because identification of the law of
closest connection as the governing law of the contract in the absence of party
choice is also prey to vagueness. Under the common law weighing of factors
method in order to arrive at the objective proper law of the contract, different
judges may arrive at different conclusions on the same facts. Under the Rome
Convention, the presumptions set out in Article 4(2) would not be a useful aid if
the judges prefer to fall back upon Article 4(5).116 Although there is dictum to the
effect that English courts should apply the presumption set out in Article 4(2)
“except where evidence clearly shows that the contract is more closely connected
with another country”,117 Hill118 demonstrates that English courts have preferred
to rely on Article 4(5) even where it is not well established that the dictum is
fulfilled: “the courts have disregarded the presumption on little more than a
balance of factors.”119 In an attempt to enhance certainty, the proposed Rome I
Regulation replaces the series of presumptions with fixed rules; the draft Article
4(1) sets out choice of law rules in favour of the law of the habitual residence of
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 43
114 P Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration in Arbitration International (1996); cited
by Hochistrasser, supra n 98, 71.
115 The role of the lex loci solutionis is examined in greater detail below; see infra section D.
116 The English courts favour a more liberal application of Article 4(5) in comparison with the
Scottish and Dutch courts. See Bank of Baroda v Vysya Bank [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 87; Definitely
Maybe (Touring) Ltd v Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH [2001] 4 All ER 283; Samcrete Egypt
Engineers and Contractors SAE v Land Rover Exports Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2019, [2002] CLC 533;
Kenburn Waste Management Ltd v Bergmann [2002] EWCA Civ 98, [2002] CLC 644. Cf Caledonia
Subsea Ltd v Micoperi Srl (First Division, Inner House, Court of Session) 2003 SC 70; Société Nouvelle des
Papeteries de l’Aa v Machinefabriek BOA, 25 September, NJ (1992) No 750, RvdW (1992) No 207
(Dutch Supreme Court). See also J Hill, “Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome
Convention: The Approach of the UK Courts” (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
325, 334–46; S Atrill, “Choice of Law in Contract: The Missing Pieces of the Article 4 Jigsaw?”
(2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 549.
117 Ennstone Building Prodicts Ltd v Stanger Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 3059, 3070 (para 41), per Keene LJ
(emphasis added). See also Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors SAE v Land Rover Exports Ltd
[2001] EWCA Civ 2019, [2002] CLC 533, 545 (para 45), per Potter LJ.
118 Hill, supra n 116, 341–44.
119 Ibid, 341.
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the characteristic performer of the contract for different categories of contracts.
However, there is inevitably a residuary provision for the law of closest connec-
tion, and all the problems that that entails, for situations where the characteristic
performer cannot be identified.120 As Jackson argues: “Uncertainty as an objec-
tion would have greater force if the principles now applied were certain. They
are not.”121 Thus, it is suggested that a close connection suffices to trigger opera-
tion of a third country’s laws.
However, the objections to direct applicability have to be examined. Applica-
tion of the public policy and mandatory rules of third countries to a contract
contrary to the parties’ wishes would undermine party autonomy and expecta-
tions.122 In addition, a serious problem created by taking into account a third
country’s laws is uncertainty. It was in fact primarily this factor which led the
United Kingdom and other countries123 to enter a reservation against Article
7(1).124 A persuasive argument on uncertainty can be made. Parties would not be
able to identify which law or laws other than the governing law or the lex fori125
would apply to their contract and thus would not have any clear indication of
which third country’s laws they would need to satisfy. If the third country is only
required to have a close or significant connection with the contract, how would
one define this required connection? If the third country is restricted to the
country of closest connection, uncertainty exists because, as alluded to above, it
is difficult to pinpoint the objective governing law in many cases.
Nevertheless, the disadvantages of applying a third country’s laws could be
overstated. Party autonomy is not all conquering; parties are unable to evade the
public policy and mandatory rules of the forum126 or of the applicable law in the
absence of choice in the case of consumers and employees.127 These are instances
where policy grounds based respectively on forum sovereignty128 and weaker
party protection outweigh party autonomy. Arguably, preservation of a third
country’s interest and comity provide a similarly strong basis for the detraction
from party autonomy and party expectations.
44 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
120 Article 4(2).
121 Jackson, supra n 9, 75. Of course, this comment has no force in cases where the parties have
chosen the applicable law.
122 Authors who disapprove of Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention include Mann, supra n 72;
Morse, supra n 66, 147; A Philip, “Mandatory Rules, Public Law (Political Rules) and Choice of
Law in the EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations” in Contract
Conflicts, 100 (para 40); PM North, “The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (1980): Its History and Main Features” in Contract Conflicts, 19–20.
123 Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Ireland.
124 Hansard HL 12 Dec 1989 Vol 513, col 1258; Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 32, 28.
125 In terms of the international mandatory rules and public policy of the lex fori.
126 Articles 7(2) and 16 of the Rome Convention.
127 Articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention.
128 The forum is entitled to refuse to act in contravention to its principles, and it is not unreasonable
to say to the parties that if they choose to litigate in a particular forum, they must take the law (ie,
the forum’s private international law) as they find it.
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The argument on uncertainty can be countered as follows. First, one must
bear in mind that there is a body of case law whereby an English court has taken
into account a third country’s mandatory laws via operation of English public
policy or application of English law as the governing law of the contract.129 Indi-
rect application has been sanctioned under English common law; it is not that
big a leap towards direct application as there exists a framework upon which one
can build. The common law cases can be examined to discover principles that
could guide courts as to how direct applicability should operate.130
Secondly, if direct applicability were to be available to the laws of any third
country with a “close connection” with the contract, one should not worry that
unacceptable uncertainty will ensue in that there would be “an uncontrolled
influx”131 of third-country laws claiming application. Everything depends on the
particular facts of the case of course but in an international contract, the possible
third-country laws that may at first glance be thought to have a claim of being of
close connection to a contract such that it has a legitimate interest in the applica-
tion of its laws are few, and when considered further, can be narrowed down
drastically. The potential laws that spring to mind are the lex loci contractus, the law
of the parties’ domicile and the lex loci solutionis.
The first option can be set aside quickly. The place where the contract is
made could be entirely fortuitous and furthermore, applicability of the lex loci
contractus is based on the vested rights theory, which has now been largely discred-
ited.132
The law of the parties’ domicile may also be dismissed.133 The relevance of
the law of the debtor’s residence or main place of business has been rejected
under the common law. In Kleinwort v Ungarische,134 the contract, governed by
English law, provided for payment in pounds sterling in London by the
Hungarian defendants. Hungary subsequently passed a decree making it illegal
for any Hungarian resident to make payment in foreign currency anywhere to
anybody unless permission was obtained from the Hungarian National Bank.135
The defendants argued that, according to the principle set out in Ralli Bros v
Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar,136 the illegality meant that they were no longer
obliged to carry out their part of the bargain as they could not do so without
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 45
129 Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470; Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] AC 301.
130 See infra section D.
131 Vischer, supra n 9, 169.
132 See Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 20–22; Babcock v Jackson [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 286, 287, per Fuld J.
133 Although the Giuliano–Lagarde Report cites the country where one party is resident or has his
main place of business as having a “genuine connection” for the purposes of Article 7(1): supra
n 32, 27. If both parties were domiciled in the same country, a stronger case may possibly be
advanced for the application of the international mandatory rules of the law of their common
domicile.
134 [1939] 2 KB 678.
135 It was inferred that the defendants had applied for and were refused such permission.
136 [1920] 2 KB 287; discussed infra, section D.1.
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breaching Hungarian law. The Court of Appeal held that the present situation
was different from Ralli in that the place of performance of the contract was
England, not Hungary: “the contract is not concerned with the steps which the
debtors may have to take to put themselves in a position to pay. It is concerned
only with the payment itself, which is to be made in this country.”137 The same
applies when the debtor is pleading existing illegality according to the law of his
domicile.138
Hence, there remains only the lex loci solutionis. The performance obligation
forms the heart of the contract and thus it has long been recognised that the lex
loci solutionis has the necessary “close connection” with a contract such that it has
a legitimate interest in having its laws applied.139 This is established under the
common law by cases such as Foster v Driscoll and Regazzoni v KC Sethia.140 In fact,
attempts to extend the principle in these two cases to illegal acts in places other
than the place of performance have been rejected.141 In Mirza Salman Ispahani v
Bank Melli Iran,142 Walker LJ affirmed that “the carrying out of prohibited acts
within the territory in question is an essential and necessary element”143 of the
principle in Foster and Regazzoni as “international comity is naturally much
readier to accept that a country’s laws ought to be obeyed within its own terri-
tory, than to recognise them as having exorbitant effect.”144 There is therefore a
body of case law concerning the relevance of the lex loci solutionis that could be
drawn upon to derive principles which will guide the courts and inform party
expectations.145
One last general point must be made. If direct application of a third country’s
public policy and mandatory rules were to be sanctioned, this would be so only
by virtue of a conflicts rule of the forum; the third country’s laws are not appli-
cable of their own accord.146 To put it in another way, the forum retains ultimate
control over the whole process.147 The interest of the third country must always
satisfy the forum’s standards of legitimacy. Furthermore, there is the additional
safeguard of forum public policy. If the result of the application of the third
country’s laws is offensive to the forum, it will be denied efficacy.
46 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
137 Ibid, at 700, per Atkinson J.
138 Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98.
139 For specific issues pertaining to electronic performance, see J Fawcett, J Harris, M Bridge, Inter-
national Sale of Goods in the Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 2005), ch 21, s III.
140 Albeit the cases establish indirect application via the operation of forum public policy. See supra,
section B.3.
141 Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98.
142 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 133.
143 Emphasis in original.
144 Cf Reynolds, supra n 48, 376, 393.
145 This is the object of section D.
146 O Lando, “Chapter 24: Contracts” in K Lipstein (chief ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law, Vol. 3 (The Hague, Tübingen, 1976), 40 (para 75).
147 Vischer, supra n 9, 169. This is the approach taken in Europe: Article 7(1) of the Rome
Convention; Article 19 of the Swiss Private International Law Statute 1987.
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All in all, the arguments against the direct applicability of a third country’s
public policy and mandatory rules can be surmounted. Of the two modes of
application, it is submitted that direct applicability represents the way forward.
The courts would be able to give proper consideration to a third country’s laws’
scope and purpose instead of hiding behind forum public policy or the governing
law of the contract and having to depend on whether there are possibilities of
consideration existing within those two laws. Indeed, if Article 8(3) of the draft
Rome I Regulation survives into the final draft, English courts will have the
discretion directly to apply a third country’s mandatory rules.148 If this turns out
to be the case, this development should be welcomed.
(c) Summary on Mode of Applicability
The following points may be made:
1. An English court should have the discretion to apply the laws of a third
country if there is a sufficiently “close connection” between the contract
and the third country such that the third country has a legitimate interest
in having its law applied. The law of the third country need not necessar-
ily be the law of closest connection to the contract.
2. This third country’s laws should be directly applied by the forum.
3. The third country that would most obviously be considered to have a
legitimate interest in having its law applied by the forum is the place of
performance. The principles that can be derived from the body of com-
mon law cases in which the interests of the lex loci solutionis have been
considered should be used as guidelines as to how a third country’s laws
that have the necessary close connection should be given effect.
3. Provisions that Take into Account a Third Country’s Laws
Having made the theoretical case for the direct application of a third country’s
laws, instances where direct application is provided for will now be examined.
There will be a general survey of the case law in other jurisdictions, international
conventions and national laws. The relevant provisions of the Rome Convention
will be analysed in detail.
(a) Case Law
The first judicial embrace of the applicability of a third country’s laws occurred
in Van Nievelt, Goudriaan and Co’s Stoomvaartmij NV v NV Hollandsche Assurantie Societeit
and Others,149 commonly known as the ALNATI case. The contract concerned the
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 47
148 See infra section C.3(c)iv.
149 HR 13 May 1966, Nederlandse Juresprudentie 1967 no. 3, annotated by LJ Hijmans van den
Bergh; (1967) 56 Revue Critique de droit international privé 522.
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carriage of goods from Belgium to Brazil between Dutch parties. The bill of
lading was delivered in Belgium. There was a choice of law clause for Dutch law.
A mandatory rule of Belgian law stipulated that the 1924 Hague Rules applied
whenever goods were loaded in a Belgian port or the bills of lading were deliv-
ered in Belgium. Dutch law had no such provision. The question was whether
the Dutch courts should take account of this Belgian mandatory rule to invalid-
ate an exclusion clause limiting the ship-owner’s liability with respect to damage
to the goods. The Hoge Raad considered whether the Belgian mandatory rule
should be applied. It concluded that the connection to Belgium was not of such a
nature as to warrant the application of Belgian mandatory rules. The impor-
tance of the decision, however, is the view of the Hoge Raad that:
“it may be that, for a foreign State, the observance of certain of its rules, even outside
its own territory, is of such importance that the courts must take account of them, and
hence apply them in preference to the law of another State which may have been cho-
sen by the parties to govern their contract.”150
Similarly, in CEP v Sensor Nederland,151 an embargo order by the United States
prohibited the export of equipment for the trans-Siberian pipeline by US
companies to the Soviet Union. The embargo applied to the supplier of the
equipment, a Dutch subsidiary of a US company. The applicable law of the
contract was Dutch law. The Dutch court held that in certain circumstances,
though the instant case was not one of them, Dutch courts had to apply the
mandatory provisions of a foreign country even where the applicable law is
Dutch law, if the contract had a sufficient connection with the country con-
cerned.
It is obvious that the fact that the foreign rule may be applicable on its own
terms to the contract in question is not sufficient to render it applicable.152 In
both ALNATI and Sensor, the respective Belgian rule and US embargo order were
applicable on their own terms to the contracts in question. If a foreign rule is
given effect to, it is in all cases because a conflict rule of the forum renders it so
applicable. In other words, the forum decides whether the connection between
the contract and the third country is sufficiently close to warrant application of
the third country’s mandatory rules.
(b) International Conventions and National Laws
Clear support for the proposition that the law of a third country should be given
effect can be found in conventions and national laws. The differences lie in the
degree of connection required between the contract and the third country.
Section 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states that the law
chosen by the parties will not be applied if:
48 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
150 Quoted in the Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 32, 26.
151 Pres Rb Den Haag, 17 September 1982, (1983) 23 International Legal Matters 66.
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“application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determi-
nation of the particular issue and which . . . would be the state of the applicable law in
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.”
The commentary explains that “fundamental policy” is something that is not
as crucial as public policy but more important than the considerations that
would make a rule mandatory only. The law of the third country here is the
applicable law in the absence of choice in relation to the issue at hand. This is
described as the law of the state which has the “most significant relationship” to
the transaction and the parties.153 The underlying governmental interest analysis
is apparent as in determining this law, the courts have to take into account the
choice of law principles stated in section 6 which lists, among other factors, “the
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states
in the determination of the particular issue.”154 Furthermore, the courts are also
requested to take into account the “justified expectations” of the parties.155
The Australian Law Reform Commission156 has proposed that the forum
must apply the international mandatory rules of a third country if the connec-
tion is “the most real and substantial”,157 by which they mean that the
mandatory rules of the objective proper law must be applied.158 In contrast,
various other Conventions do not insist that the law of the third country must be
the objective applicable law. For example, Article 16(2) of the Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition of 1985 provides that
“in exceptional circumstances”, the forum has a discretion to apply the inter-
national mandatory rules of third States if that State “has a sufficiently close
connection with the case”.159 Article 16 of the Hague Convention of the Law
Applicable to Agency 1978 gives the forum a discretion to apply the “mandatory
rules of any State with which the situation has a significant connection” while
Article 11 of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Inter-
national Contracts permits the forum to apply “the mandatory provisions of the
law of another State with which the contract has close ties”.160 Article 9(2) of the
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 49
152 Hartley, supra n 9, 359; Lando, supra n 146, 40.
153 S 188.
154 S 6(2)(c).
155 S 6(2)(d).
156 Choice of Law (Report No 58)(Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992).
157 Ibid, 179: Clause 9(9) of the Draft Choice of Law Bill 1992. There is no element of discretion for
the forum.
158 Ibid, 93 (para 8.36).
159 The United Kingdom did not enact Article 16(2). States that have ratified the Convention
without entering a reservation against Article 16(2) are Australia, Italy, Malta and the
Netherlands. Liechtenstein and San Marino (non-Member States) also acceded to the Convention
without making a reservation against Article 16(2).
160 Whilst it is true that these two Conventions have not been ratified by many States and the
Australian Choice of Law Bill has not been implemented, that these instruments provide for
direct application of a third country’s laws illustrates that the principle has support in many
disparate corners of the world.
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Basel Resolutions of the Institute of International Law states that the mandatory
rules in the international sense of a third country can override the chosen law if
there is a “close link” between the contract and the third country and if they
“further such aims as are generally accepted by the international community”.
This last proviso is not found in other provisions and proposals161 and given that
there was no international consensus about the Prohibition in the 1920s or the
trade embargoes against South Africa in the 1950s,162 is probably too nebulous a
concept to be practicable.
Lastly, mention must be made of Article 19(1) of the Swiss Private Inter-
national Law Statute 1987.163 This permits the court “to take into consideration”
the mandatory law of a third State “if interests that are according to Swiss views
legitimate and clearly overriding so require and the case is closely connected to
that law”. Article 19(2) goes on to give additional guidance as to how the discre-
tion should be exercised: “whether such a provision should be taken into account
depends on its policy and its consequences for a judgment that is fair according
to Swiss views”. It is clear that Swiss attitudes as to the interests of the third
country and outcome of the case if the third country’s laws are applied are para-
mount. In addition, the court must balance party autonomy with the desire of
the third State in having its laws applied.
(c) The Rome Convention and the Proposed Rome I Regulation
Article 16, which permits application of forum public policy, has been mentioned
above. There is however, no provision which caters for the application of the
public policy of a third country.164 In contrast, a number of provisions provide for
the application of the mandatory rules of a third country. These provisions will
now be looked at. Discussion will take place on the basis of the Rome Conven-
tion although relevant changes effected by the proposed Rome I Regulation will
be discussed.
(i) Special Contracts: Articles 5 and 6
Weaker party protection is one area where it is readily acknowledged that a third
country’s laws may have a role to play. This area has so far not been touched
upon as this article is concerned with the general issues concerning the applica-
tion of a third state’s mandatory rules and public policy and not the specific
policy reason of weaker party protection. However, special provisions in the
Rome Convention safeguard a weaker party’s interests by providing for applica-
50 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
161 Nygh, supra n 25, 222.
162 Ibid, 226.
163 This is a general provision which is not confined to contract choice of law.
164 Whether this omission is sound is considered infra, section D.3.
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tion of the mandatory rules of a third country. The relevant provisions will
therefore be looked at briefly for the sake of completeness.
Articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention ensure that employees and con-
sumers are not deprived of the protection offered by the domestic mandatory
rules of the law of the country which would have been the applicable law of the
contract but for the choice of a different law. Thus, a consumer will, if certain
criteria are fulfilled, have the benefit of the mandatory rules of the law of the
country of his habitual residence.165 An employee will be able to rely on the
mandatory rules of either the law of the country in which he habitually carries
out his work in performance of the contract, or the law of the country in which
the place of business through which he was engaged is situated.166 The policy
behind these special choice of law rules, that is, that freedom of contract should
be curtailed where both parties are not of equal bargaining power,167 is main-
tained in the proposed Rome I Regulation. In fact, Article 5, which covers
consumer contracts, has now been altered so that the applicable law for
consumer contracts is the law of the consumer’s habitual residence; there is no
longer any need separately to provide for the application of the mandatory rules
of the law of the consumer’s habitual residence. However, the draft Articles 5(2)
and 5(3) limit the application of Article 5(1); Article 5(2) by laying down certain
conditions to be fulfilled before one can rely upon Article 5(1), and Article 5(3) by
excluding certain types of contracts from its scope. Thus, the protection offered
to the weaker party is not all encompassing. This also links in with the point that
imbalances in bargaining strength exist outside the typical consumer and
employee situations. For example, there may be a difference in strength in cases
of companies entering into contracts with each other, such as agency and fran-
chise contracts.168 In these situations, the ability of a court to take into account a
third state’s laws could offer protection to parties who do not fall within the
conventional “weaker parties” situation. In addition, the justifications set out
above169 demonstrate that a third country could have a legitimate interest in
having its public policy and mandatory rules applied to a contract even where
this protectionist dimension does not exist. The other provisions that will be
considered fall within this scenario.
(ii) Article 3(3)
Article 3(3) states that where the parties have chosen a foreign law and “all the
other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected
with one country only”, this “shall not prejudice . . . the application of rules of
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 51
165 Article 5(2).
166 Article 6(2).
167 Jaffey, supra n 33, 235.
168 Nordic Group for Private International Law, supra n 110, 45; Philip, supra n 122, 105.
169 Section C.1.
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the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by contract”.170 The
reference here, as in Articles 5 and 6, is to domestic mandatory rules.171
Article 3(3) operates in the limited circumstance where the parties have
chosen a foreign law to govern what is as good as a domestic English contract
apart from the choice of a foreign law, or in the converse situation where the
parties have chosen English law to govern what is as good as a, for example,
domestic French contract.172 As Boggiano notes, Article 3(3) “prevents a fictitious
internationalization of an objectively domestic contract simply to oust manda-
tory rules”.173 In other words, parties should not be allowed to evade the
operation of rules of law by the simple expedient of choosing a foreign law to
govern what is otherwise a domestic contract. Paradoxically, the contract’s
“home state” is considered as the “third country” here.
The academic consensus is that application or non-application would depend
on whether the law of the country to which the mandatory rule belongs
considers the rule to be applicable in the particular context before the court.174
However, the forum retains some discretion as it has to decide whether the rele-
vant elements for the purposes of Article 3(3) are connected with one country
only.175 The Giuliano–Lagarde Report does not give much guidance on this issue
at all.176 Lasok and Stone argue that a broad construction should be given to
“relevant elements of the situation” and give as an example a contract that may
have some connection with other countries because it is part of a string as still
falling under Article 3(3) as “it is entirely reasonable for parties to arrange that
the whole chain be governed by the same law in order to ensure that a seller who
52 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
170 This provision has not been changed substantively in the proposed Rome I Regulation and is now
Article 3(4) in the proposal.
171 See supra, section B.2.
172 See Bankers Trust International plc v RCS Editori SpA [1996] CLC 899 at 905; Shell International
Petroleum Co Ltd v Coral Oil Co Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 72, 78–79; NM Rothschild Ltd v Equitable Life
Assurance Society & ORS [2002] EWHC 1021 (QB); Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation v SNC
Passion [2004] EWHC 569 (Comm), [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 99 for unsuccessful attempts to invoke
Article 3(3).
173 A Boggiano, International Standard Contracts: The Price of Fairness (London, Graham & Trotman/
Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 46.
174 Philip, supra n 122, 95; Morse, supra n 66, 123; Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 558. For example,
even though the requirement of consideration for a valid contract under English law is a domestic
English mandatory rule, it may well be that an English court will not insist on its application
where the parties have chosen a foreign applicable law as it is a rule which is neither protectionist
nor based on strong public policy grounds: Fawcett et al, supra n 139, 691 (footnote 217).
175 Philip, supra n 122, 95; Morse, supra n 66, 123. According to NM Rothschild Ltd v Equitable Life
Assurance Society & ORS [2002] EWHC 1021 (QB), the place of domicile of a lending bank is a
relevant factor under Article 3(3). In a case decided under the common law, the fact that the
plaintiff company was incorporated in Hong Kong did not stop the court from striking out a
choice of law clause for Hong Kong law as not being made in good faith when all other factors
were connected with Queensland: Golden Acres Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd [1969] Qd R 378. If
the same approach is taken under the Convention, the place of incorporation might not be a
relevant factor under Article 3(3): Fawcett et al, supra n 139, 691 (footnote 213).
176 Supra n 32, 18.
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is held liable to his buyer shall have a claim to indemnity from his own seller”.177
However, a stricter approach is suggested by Cooke J’s dictum in Caterpillar Finan-
cial Services Corporation v SNC Passion: “It is noteworthy that Article 3(3) refers to
elements ‘relevant to the situation’ which is wider than ‘elements relevant to the
contract’.”178 His Lordship cited179 with approval a passage in Dicey and Morris
where the authors conclude that Article 3(3) does not apply to contracts, such as
string contracts,180 which are apparently connected with one country but have
some connection with other countries.181
Insofar as Article 3(3) is geared towards a purely domestic contract which has
been “internationalised” by a choice of a foreign governing law, this strict
approach must be correct.182 However, one of the purposes behind Article 3(3) is
to prevent “fraudulent evasion” of the law.183 If this is so, why should non-essen-
tial connecting factors be considered as “relevant to the situation”? For example,
in a contract expressed to be governed by English law, if both parties are
German and the contract is for the sale of goods in Germany, it should not
matter that the goods were manufactured in France.184 The connection with
France is incidental and it would be unlikely for the parties to have in mind
evasion of mandatory provisions of French law which would have been appli-
cable if French law was the applicable law of the contract, rather than evasion of
similar provisions of German law. In fact, if a narrow construction is taken of
Article 3(3) so that the connection with France invalidates reliance on Article
3(3), there may be no means by which a court could superimpose the domestic
mandatory rules of German law upon the contract. If Germany is the forum,
only its international mandatory rules would be applicable under Article 7(2). If,
say, England provides the forum, not even German international mandatory
rules,185 much less German domestic mandatory rules, would be applicable.
Thus, a narrow reading of what the “relevant elements of the situation” consti-
tutes runs the risk of subverting the aim of preventing evasion of the law.
April 2006 Journal of Private International Law 53
177 Lasok and Stone, supra n 55, 377.
178 [2004] EWHC 569 (Comm), [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 99, 103 (para 18).
179 [2004] EWHC 569 (Comm), [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 99, 103 (para 19).
180 The other example given is insurance arrangements.
181 Supra n 23, 1220 (para 32–069).
182 The Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 32, 18, states that Article 3(3) represented a compromise
between two ideas: on the one hand, that the Convention should only apply to an international
situation, and on the other hand, that there should be complete freedom to choose a foreign law
in good faith.
183 As is made clear by the Explanatory Memorandum with respect to Article 3(4) of the proposed
Rome I Regulation, which transposes Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention: COM (2005) 650
final, 6.
184 See Lasok and Stone, supra n 55, 377.
185 Due to the reservation against Article 7(1): section 2(2) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act
1990.
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(iii) Article 10(2)
With regard to contracts that are truly international in nature, provision for
recourse to the law of a third country, in particular the lex loci solutionis, can be
found in Article 10(2). This sets out that: “In relation to the manner of perfor-
mance and the steps to be taken in the event of defective performance regard
shall be had to the law of the country in which performance takes place.” This
should be contrasted with Article 10(1)(b), which provides that the applicable law
of the contract governs its performance.186 The difference between “manner
of performance” and “performance” is not clearly articulated. The Giuliano–
Lagarde Report notes that the former is a concept that is interpreted differently
in various laws; hence there was a reluctance to give a “strict definition” of the
phrase.187 Nevertheless, the Report does state that the lex fori will determine what
is meant by “manner of performance”.188 Kaye argues that the phrase should be
taken to include non-performance,189 in which case a party who does not
perform his obligation because the act is illegal by the lex loci solutionis would be
absolved from liability for non-performance.190 However, it appears that Article
10(2) covers the more “minor” details of the contract; for example, the Giuliano–
Lagarde Report gives the following as examples of matters falling within its
scope: rules governing public holidays, the manner in which goods are to be
examined, and the steps to be taken if they are refused.191 Cheshire and North192
observe that under the common law, “manner of performance” was similarly
interpreted to cover minor issues such as the currency in which a debt is
dischargeable193 and the date at which lay days begin to run.194 Dicey and Morris
also conclude that the scope of the law of the place of performance under Article
10(2) “is confined to matters concerned with the mode, place and time of perfor-
mance, and does not extend to matters which affect the substance of the
obligation”.195
In East West Corporation v DKBS 1912,196 Thomas J thought that the common
law distinction between the substance of the performance, which is governed by
the proper law of the contract, and the mode of performance, which is governed
54 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
186 Both Articles 10(1)(b) and 10(2) are unchanged in the proposed Rome I Regulation (now Articles
11(1)(b) and 11(2) respectively).
187 Supra n 32, 33.
188 Ibid.
189 Kaye, supra n 53, 304.
190 A similar argument is made with respect to supervening illegality according to the law of the
place of performance by Diamond, supra n 16, 296; criticised by Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 602.
191 Supra n 32, 33.
192 Supra n 32, 597.
193 Mount Albert Borough Council v Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society [1938]
AC 224, 241.
194 Norden Steamship Co v Dempsey (1876) 1 CPD 654, esp 662–63.
195 Supra n 23, 1263 (para 32–195).
196 [2002] EWHC 83; [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 182; hereafter East West.
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by the law of the place of performance, was maintained by Article 10 of the
Rome Convention.197 East West concerned a contract for the delivery of goods to
Chile, the contract being contained in bills of lading which were governed by
English law. The defendant carriers had delivered goods to a licensed customs
warehouse in Chile and the goods were thereafter released without presentation
of the original bills of lading to a third party. The third party defaulted on some
of the payments owed to the claimants for the goods. The claimants sued for the
loss caused by the failure of the defendants to deliver the goods only against
presentation of the bill of lading as required under English law. Thomas J held
that regard had to be had to provisions of the law of Chile under which original
bills of lading had to be retained by the Chilean customs and could only be pre-
sented to the carrier and then returned. However, since the defendant carriers
could have contracted with the warehouse operator on terms that an original bill
of lading had to be presented before the goods were released, they were liable for
the loss.198
Despite recognising that the mode under which the delivery obligation is
discharged is modified by provisions in the law of Chile specifying the manner in
which cargo in Chile had to be delivered, Thomas J went on to say that this
modification of discharge by the law of Chile “is in no way inconsistent with the
basic obligation under these bills of lading in English law to deliver against
presentation of the bill of lading”.199 He left open the situation if Chilean law
had been incompatible with English law.200 Thus, the question arises as to
whether regard can be had to the law of the place of performance with respect to
the manner of performance only to the extent that it is not incompatible with the
governing law of the contract.
On the one hand, allowing the law of the place of performance effect with
respect to the mode of performance only if it is compatible with the governing
law of the contract seems to be in keeping with the phrases used in Article 10.
Article 10(1)(b) establishes that the applicable law of the contract “shall govern”
performance, while Article 10(2) uses the phrase “regard shall be had” in relation
to the law of the place of performance. The latter phrasing is less imperative
than the former. In addition, manner of performance could be argued to
comprise a subset of the substantive obligation of performance. Therefore one
could argue that it is the applicable law of the contract which is the overarching
governing law with respect to all aspects of performance.
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197 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 182, 194 (para 64).
198 Under English law, the bill of lading should have been surrendered to and kept by the defendant
carriers: [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 182, 206 (para 134).
199 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 182, 206 (para 134).
200 [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 182, 206 (para 135). See also Import Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud Americana
de Vapores SA [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 405, 416 (para 25).
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On the other hand, insistence on compatibility with the applicable law of the
contract could make the existence of Article 10(2) meaningless in some cases.201
This is because disputes may arise where the applicable law of the contract and
the law of the place of performance have different rules and the parties are
seeking to argue that the rule pertains to “performance” or “manner of perfor-
mance” respectively. To say that one concerns the substance and the other the
minor aspects of performance is only to establish a very general framework in
which grey areas remain. For example, in the Giuliano–Lagarde Report, time of
delivery is listed as an issue going to the “performance” of the contract202 whilst
rules governing public holidays is cited as a matter falling within “manner of
performance”.203 Let us assume that there is a contract governed by Ruritanian
law to deliver food in Utopia for a Christmas party and Utopian law forbids such
delivery on a religious holiday. No such bar operates under Ruritanian law. Is the
Utopian rule one pertaining to “time of delivery” or a “rule governing public
holidays”? To look at this from another angle, one could potentially interpret the
contract as being in substance for the delivery of food in Utopia on Christmas
day, or alternatively, one could ignore the motive of the contract and construe it
as being in substance for the delivery of food in Utopia, with the question of
whether delivery can take place on a certain date being classified as an issue of
“manner of performance”. The point is that until one is able to delineate clearly
between the two concepts of “performance” and “manner of performance”,
insistence on compatibility between the applicable law of the contract and the
law of the place of performance would rob Article 10(2) of significance. Alterna-
tively, even if one could make a clear delineation between the two concepts, it
surely then is not imperative for the applicable law of the contract to have a say
over the merely minor aspects of performance. Therefore, it is submitted that the
better view is that compatibility between the law of the place of performance
and the applicable law of the contract as to the manner of performance should
not be required under Article 10(2).
(iv) Article 7(1)
The most crucial provision in the Rome Convention for the purposes of this
article is Article 7(1). This envisages a more substantive application of the law of
a third country than Article 10(2) and provides that:
56 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
201 The Giuliano–Lagarde Report states that the applicable law of the contract would “embrace the
totality” of conditions going towards performance of the obligation arising under the contract
“but not the manner of its performance” (supra n 32, 32). This implies that the law of the place
of performance will prevail over the applicable law of the contract in cases of conflict over the
manner of performance. This is also the view taken by Fawcett et al, supra n 139, 720 (para
13.161).
202 Supra n 32, 32. It has been noted that this is controversial as time of delivery also appears to relate
to the manner of performance: Fawcett et al, ibid, 721 (para 13.163).
203 Supra n 32, 33.
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“When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the
mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close
connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be
applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give
effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to
the consequences of their application or non-application.”
Article 7(1) is based on the ALNATI 204 case205 and the wording suggests that it
owes much to Article 16 of the Hague Convention on Agency.206 There were
fears that Article 7(1) introduced an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the
law. First, “close connection” was thought to be vague;207 secondly, the provision
left a discretion in the hands of the courts as to whether to give effect to the iden-
tified third country’s mandatory rules.208 These fears led the United Kingdom to
enter a reservation against it.209
However, the European Commission has now published its proposal for a
Rome I Regulation.210 Article 8(1) defines mandatory rules as “rules the respect
for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its political, social
or economic organisation to such an extent that they are applicable to any situa-
tion falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the
contract under this Regulation”.211 Article 8(3) preserves and expands on Article
7(1):
“Effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which
the situation has a close connection. In considering whether to give effect to these
mandatory rules, courts shall have regard to their nature and purpose in accordance
with the definition in paragraph 1 and to the consequences of their application or
non-application for the objective pursued by the relevant mandatory rules and for the
parties.”
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204 HR 13 May 1966, Nederlandse Juresprudentie 1967 no 3, annotated by LJ Hijmans van den
Bergh; (1967) 56 Revue Critique de droit international privé 522. Facts above, text to n 149.
205 Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 32, 26. For differences between the ALNATI principle and Art-
icle 7(1), see J Schultsz, “Dutch Antecedents and Parallels to Article 7 of the EEC Contracts
Convention of 1980” (1983) 47 Rabels Zeitschrift 267, 276–77.
206 Plender, supra n 110, 185 (para 9–04).
207 The Giuliano–Lagarde Report gives two examples of when the “close connection” requirement
would be fulfilled. One is when the third country is the place of performance and the other is
when one of the parties is resident or has his main place of business in that country: supra n 32,
27. Mann has observed that Article 7(1) allows the third country’s law a far greater effect than the
governing law or the lex fori. Whereas a “close connection” is sufficient to trigger consideration of
the mandatory rules of a third country, “[f]or the proper law to apply there must be a real choice
by the parties or a close and substantial connection. For the public policy of the forum to apply
some elementary principle of justice or morality must be at stake”: supra n 72, 36. Cf Jackson,
supra n 9, 73–74.
208 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 584.
209 Section 2(2) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.
210 COM (2005) 650 final.
211 Inspired by the passage in Arblade (Case C–369/96), para 30; cited supra, text to n 29.
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There are several things to note about this development. First, the legal basis
for the conversion of the Rome Convention into a Regulation is Article 65(b) of
the Treaty establishing the European Community. This allows measures for the
promotion of the “compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States
concerning the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction” to be adopted “in so far as
necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”. However, doubts
have been raised as to the Community’s competence in an area which is not
restricted to intra-Community fact situations.212 The UK Government gives the
example of an English court hearing a dispute between two South Korean
domiciliaries regarding an alleged breach of contract committed outside the
European Union. Here, the connection with the Union and the proper func-
tioning of the internal market is “highly tenuous”.213 Similar reservations214
regarding the Community’s competence under Article 65(b) with respect to the
proposed Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obli-
gations have not prevented the Commission from asserting its “discretion to
determine whether a measure is necessary for the proper functioning of the
internal market”.215 Nevertheless, despite the dubiousness of the legal basis for
conversion into a Regulation of universal application, the corollary, ie, to have
one choice of law system for intra-Community disputes with Member States
individually adopting another system for extra-Community cases, would result in
complexity and confusion.216
Secondly, the proposed Rome I Regulation falls within Title IV of the Treaty
establishing the European Community and does not apply to the United
Kingdom by virtue of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty unless the United
Kingdom exercises its right to opt into the instrument. It is improbable, notwith-
standing doubts as to its legal basis, that the United Kingdom will not opt into
the Regulation, not least because it has enacted the Rome Convention into its
law since 1990.217
Thirdly, reservations are generally not compatible with Regulations and a
right to make reservations is not conferred in the draft Regulation. Unless this is
introduced, or Article 8(3) is discarded in the final version of the Regulation, the
discretion directly to apply a third country’s mandatory rules will become part of
58 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
212 The Rome Convention and the draft Rome I Regulation are universal in application; see Article
1(1) of both instruments.
213 Response of the Government of the United Kingdom, para 4. Document accessible online at: http://www.
europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/united_kingdom_
en.pdf.
214 Select Committee on European Union, Eighth Report of Session 2003–04: The Rome II Regulation –
Report with Evidence (HL Paper 66) (2004) (London, HMSO), 18–24 (paras 50–72); document also
accessible online at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/66/
6602.htm (as on 23 February 2006).
215 COM (2003) 427 final, 6 (hereafter the “proposed Rome II Regulation”). The most recent revised
version of the proposed Regulation can be found at COM (2006) 83 final.
216 See Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, supra n 4, 11.
217 Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.
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the law of the United Kingdom. That this will be the case seems more likely than
not given that the counterpart to Article 8(3) in the proposed Rome II Regula-
tion is preserved in the most recent version of the Rome II proposal218 thereby
indicating the Commission’s commitment to the principle of direct applicability
of a third country’s mandatory rules.219 It will be obvious from the arguments
made in the preceding sections that this author thinks that this would be a
welcome development in English law.
A few points may be further developed in support of this position. Courts may
prefer to utilise their traditional indirect method of taking into account a third
country’s laws. However, dependence upon application of forum public policy
indirectly to give effect to the mandatory rule of a third country is restricted
given the negative phrasing of Article 16 which envisages disapplication, not
application, of a foreign rule.220 Thus, Foster and Regazzoni cannot be considered
to have survived the Rome Convention.221 There has been an attempt to argue
that the Foster line of cases could instead be preserved through application of
Article 7(2) but the basis for this argument is ambiguous.222 Hartley submits that
the cases involve application of a domestic English rule which can be regarded as
a mandatory rule for the purposes of Article 7(2).223 How a domestic English rule
would warrant application under Article 7(2) is unclear as an English domestic
mandatory rule would only apply when English law is the applicable law of the
contract, whereas Article 7(2) refers to mandatory rules which apply irrespective
of the applicable law of the contract. In addition, as Cheshire and North point out,
to construe a common law rule based on comity between nations as a domestic
law rule is tantamount to a “fiction”.224 Thus, the fact that a case similar to Foster
and Regazzoni which falls within the scope of the Rome Convention cannot, it
would seem, be decided the same way in England points to there being a lacuna
in the law and the need for a provision like Article 7(1).225
It is also worth reiterating that the indirect method of application is
dependent upon opportunities to take into account a third country’s laws existing
within the governing law of the contract or the lex fori,226 rather than focusing on
the integrity of the third country’s rule itself. For example, Vischer points out
that the focus on immorality under German law in cases like Kulturgüterfall 227
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218 Article 13(2), COM (2006) 83 final.
219 In addition, no objections to this principle appear to have been raised in the European Parliament
at first reading in plenary session on 6 July 2005: A6-0211/2005 (Rapporteur: D Wallis).
220 Supra, text to nn 51–55.
221 See supra, text to n 55.
222 Hartley, supra n 9, 403. See also Jaffey, supra n 33, 250.
223 Hartley, supra n 9, 403.
224 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 586.
225 It is somewhat ironic that it is countries such as the UK and Germany, both of which believe that
a third country’s laws should be accorded respect, who have chosen to make a reservation against
Article 7(1).
226 Supra, section C.2(a).
227 BGH, 22 June 1972; BGHZ 69, 82; facts supra, text to nn 97–99.
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means that a contract will only be invalid if the foreign prohibition was already
in force at the time of conclusion of the contract as an intentional evasion of
supervening laws does not make sense.228 Direct applicability under Article 8(3)
would better reflect the legitimate interest of a third country in having its law
applied where there is a requisite close connection and the underlying comity-
based reasons for taking into account a third country’s laws which were set out
above.229
Furthermore, although concerns about uncertainty will probably be raised
against Article 8(3), these concerns could be overstated. There are no reports of
insurmountable problems of uncertainty, or even costs and workload for courts
from countries which did enact Article 7(1) into their laws.230 In addition, a
narrow construction of Article 8(3) would cut down on uncertainty. The close
connection for both Article 8(3) and Article 7(1) is phrased in relation to the
“situation”. In the Giuliano–Lagarde Report, it is stated that the close connec-
tion must exist between the law of the third country and the contract as a whole,
and the drafters rejected a proposal from one delegation that the connection
must be between the point in dispute and a specific law.231 Yet, if the “situation”
concerns non-payment in Ruritania, it would be strange if the mandatory rules
of Ruritania on payment are not referred to as being those of a country with a
close connection under Article 7(1) merely because there is a close connection
between the contract as a whole and Utopia, the place where the contract is
concluded and where the seller has his main place of business.232 Furthermore,
the emphasis in the Giuliano–Lagarde Report on the close connection between
the third country and the contract as a whole is arguably misplaced as one would
not expect the mandatory rules of payment in Utopia to be relevant merely
because there is a close connection between the contract and Utopia in a general
sense. Article 8(3) would thus benefit from a narrower construction, ie, that the
close connection must be between the specific aspect of the contract which is in
dispute and the third country.233 This narrow construction would better reflect
circumstances where the third country has a legitimate interest in having its
mandatory rules applied and serve to increase certainty by restricting the
contexts in which a third country’s mandatory rules may be considered relevant.
Certainty is also enhanced by the text of Article 8(3) which strives to give
more pointers than its predecessor as to how courts should exercise their dis-
60 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
228 Vischer, supra n 9, 171. On the issue of supervening illegality, see infra section D.1.
229 Section C.1.
230 Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, supra n 4, 72. In fact, it
has been argued that Article 7(1) actually introduces certainty into the law and that the indirect
and ad hoc method that has been taken towards application of a third country’s laws by English
and German courts creates far more uncertainty and unpredictability: (2001) 114 Harvard Law
Review 2462, 2468–77. See also Kaye, supra n 53, 253.
231 Supra n 32, 27.
232 Example derived from Kaye, supra n 53, 254–55.
233 Ibid, 255. Cf (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 2462, 2475–76.
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cretion to apply a third country’s mandatory rules.234 For one, the court is now
expressly directed to consider the objective pursued by the relevant mandatory
rule. The echo with the US governmental interest analysis235 is obvious and sup-
ports the narrow construction of Article 8(3) suggested above by focusing on the
interest of the third country in having its laws applied. For another, the court has
to consider the effect on the parties of application or non-application of the iden-
tified third country’s mandatory rules. This is a new addition.236 It presumably
allows the court to take into account the parties’ legitimate expectations as to
whether the third country’s mandatory rule applies. For example, if performance
subsequently becomes illegal according to the law of the place of performance,
non-application of the mandatory rule would expose the party carrying out
performance to sanctions in the place of performance if the contract is enforced.
In this situation, the parties’ legitimate expectations would probably be that the
performance should be abandoned and the court should take account of this.237
However, a fine balance has to be wrought; the essence of a mandatory rule is
that it embodies policies which are held to be of such importance by the country
which enacts it so that the rule prevails over party autonomy and expectations.238
If the third country is acknowledged to have the requisite “close connection” and
the nature, purpose and object of its mandatory rule is such that application of it
is legitimately warranted, the consequences of its application on the parties
should not be given undue weight under Article 8(3).
In addition to guidance found in the text of Article 8(3) as to how courts
should exercise their discretion, the body of common law cases whereby English
courts have indirectly given effect to the lex loci solutionis contains principles that
can inform and guide courts as to the future application of Article 8(3). The deri-
vation of such principles is the aim of the next section.
D. LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS
Acceptance that courts should have a discretion directly to apply a third coun-
try’s laws raises questions as to how the discretion should be exercised. Three
issues spring to mind. First, in considering whether to give effect to a third coun-
try’s mandatory rules, does it matter when a particular law is enacted? Secondly,
references to the applicability of a third country’s laws in the case law, conven-
tions and provisions in the Rome Convention which were canvassed earlier have
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234 Cf Article 13(2) of the proposed Rome II Regulation, COM (2006) 83 final, which merely
reiterates the text of Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention.
235 See supra, section C.1(a).
236 This consideration of the parties’ interests is similar to Article 19 of the Swiss PIL Statute; see
supra, section C.3(b).
237 See infra, section D.1.
238 Hartley, supra n 9, 364.
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only referred to the third country’s mandatory rules. What impact does the
public policy of the third country have? Connected with this issue is whether a
distinction should be made between the public policy of a third country and its
mandatory rules. This will be the third issue discussed.
The classic example of a third country that has a legitimate interest in having
its laws applied in an international contract is the place of performance. English
courts have long given indirect effect to the lex loci solutionis under the common
law. It is suggested that the answers to the three issues lie within an analysis of
case law concerning the lex loci solutionis.
1. Is There a Distinction Between Existing and Supervening
Illegality According to a Mandatory Rule of the Lex Loci Solutionis?
Cases such as Foster v Driscoll 239 and Regazzoni v KC Sethia,240 which were discussed
above, concerned existing illegality. The parties had agreed to break an existing
mandatory rule of the place of performance. The principle that was established
was that it was against the English public policy of maintaining good relations
with friendly foreign states to enforce contracts that are illegal according to the
law of the place of performance, and this principle applied regardless of the
governing law of the contract. It has been argued above that the cases should be
seen as instances where the English court ultimately applied the mandatory rules
of a third country, ie, the lex loci solutionis.
The question that needs to be considered here is whether the Foster principle
applies when the issue is supervening, as opposed to existing, illegality according
to the law of the place of performance. Should the forum give effect to a manda-
tory rule of the place of performance which only becomes the law after the
making of the contract?
In Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar,241 a contract governed by English
law concerning the charter of a vessel provided for payment at a certain rate to
be made in Spain. Subsequently, the contractual rate became illegal under
Spanish law which decreed a lower maximum rate. The Court of Appeal held
that the plaintiff failed in his action for payment at the higher contractual rate.
Scrutton LJ stated:
“where a contract requires an act to be done in a foreign country, it is, in the absence
of very special circumstances, an implied term of the continuing validity of such a
provision that the act to be done in the foreign country shall not be illegal by the law of
that country”.242
62 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
239 [1929] 1 KB 470.
240 [1958] AC 301.
241 [1920] 2 KB 287; hereafter “Ralli Bros”.
242 Ibid, 304.
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There is some doubt as to whether the rule laid down in Ralli Bros is a domes-
tic English rule or a conflicts rule. There have been contradictory dicta on this
point.243 The prevailing academic view is that it is a domestic rule of English law,
ie, it is the application of English domestic contract law on frustration under
which a contract that subsequently becomes illegal to perform is unenforce-
able.244 As such, it is only applicable when the governing law of the contract is
English law. On this reasoning, in all cases of subsequent illegality by the lex loci
solutionis, it is for the governing law of the contract to determine the effects of
such illegality.245
However, Kaye246 suggests that the comity reasoning present in cases such as
Foster247 and Regazzoni248 could also be used as a more general basis to support the
decision in Ralli Bros; ie, a contract that stipulates performance that subsequently
becomes illegal by the lex loci solutionis would be against the public policy of the
forum of maintaining good relations with friendly foreign states. This is a subtly
different proposition from that which was rejected by Goff J in Toprak v Finagrain
when he refused to merge the principles in Ralli and Foster into one wider prin-
ciple.249 In Toprak, the buyers were a Turkish state economic enterprise while the
sellers were a Swiss subsidiary of a New York company. The contract was
governed by English law and provided for payment by means of a letter of credit
confirmed by a first-class US or West European bank. The Turkish buyers
wanted to open a letter of credit in Turkey and had to obtain the necessary
foreign exchange allocation from the Turkish Ministry of Finance in accordance
with Turkish law. However, authorisation was not given. They argued that it
must have been contemplated by both parties that the buyers would have to open
the letter of credit in Turkey. Since the appropriate consent was not obtained,
they were relieved from liability owing to illegality by the law of the place where
it was contemplated by the parties that the contract would be performed. Goff J
held that there was no finding of fact that the parties had contemplated that the
letter of credit would be opened in Turkey; there was nothing under the contract
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243 For dicta which suggests Ralli is a conflicts rule, see Regazzoni [1958] AC 301, 322, per Viscount
Simonds; Cantiere Navale Triestina v Handelsvertretung [1925] 2 KB 172, 208, per Atkin LJ. In
Zivnostenka Bank v Frankman [1950] AC 57, 78, Lord Reid observed that it is “settled law that,
whatever be the proper law of the contract, an English court will not require a party to do an act
in performance of a contract which would be an offence under the law in force at the place where
the act is to be done”; whereas in Kahler v Midland Bank Ltd [1950] AC 24, 48, his Lordship stated
that: “the law of England will not require an act to be done in performance of an English
contract if such act . . . would be unlawful by the country in which the act is to be done”.
244 Dicey and Morris, supra n 23, 1246–48; Nygh, supra n 25, 224; Hartley, supra n 9, 392; FA Mann,
“Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law” (1937) 18 British Yearbook of International
Law 97, 110–11; Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 601.
245 Under the Rome Convention, this would fall within Article 10(1)(b) of the Rome Convention.
246 Kaye, supra n 53, 240–41.
247 [1929] 1 KB 470.
248 [1958] AC 301.
249 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98, 107 (hereafter “Toprak”).
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which stipulated so.250 Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal emphasised, the
place of performance was not Turkey and therefore illegality by Turkish law
afforded no defence to the claim.251 Compliance with formalities necessary
within Turkey were the buyers’ responsibility and the sellers were only concerned
that there should be an irrevocable letter of credit confirmed by a first-class US
or West European bank.252
Goff J refused to combine the Ralli and Foster principles into a proposition that
“English law will not enforce a contract where performance involves the doing in
a foreign friendly country an act which is illegal by the law of that country.”253
His worry there was that the word “involves” was ambiguous and could be
construed as including the word “contemplates”. Thus, it appears as if Goff J’s
reluctance in drawing a parallel between Ralli and Foster is due to the fact that
doing so could have raised the danger that the law of a friendly foreign country
which is not the contractually stipulated place of performance but rather the
location of incidental acts which are contemplated by both parties may be carried
out in fulfilment of the main performance obligation would nullify or render a
contract unenforceable. If this is the correct basis for Goff J’s reluctance, then his
worry can be put to rest. As Goff J himself stated earlier in his judgment,
“performance” under the Ralli Bros principle can only refer to performance
which is necessary and contractually required under the contract,254 not
performance of incidental acts leading up to the main contractually stipulated
performance. One of the parties must be assumed to take on the risk of being
unable to perform the incidental acts.
Comity was not expressly discussed in the Ralli Bros judgments, but as Goff J
recognised, Ralli Bros and Foster were “related in the sense that they spring from
the root principle of comity, a root which . . . is capable of new growth from time
to time”.255 Therefore, it is suggested that operation of the Ralli Bros principle
should not depend upon English being the governing law of the contract. It
should be extended256 and regarded as a conflicts rule applicable whatever the
governing law of the contract.257 However, it has been argued that the comity
argument is less strong where the parties act in good faith and performance only
subsequently becomes illegal because of a change in the law of the place of
64 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
250 Ibid, 105.
251 Ibid, 114.
252 Ibid, 105 (Goff J) and 114 (CA).
253 Ibid, 107.
254 Ibid, 106. See also Kleinwort, Son & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie Aktiengesellschaft [1939] 2 KB
678, 687–88.
255 Toprak, supra n 249, 107.
256 On the assumption that the academic views as to the domestic nature of the Ralli Bros principle is
correct.
257 This proposition would be acceptable to Dicey and Morris. The authors state that if the contract is
governed by the law of a foreign country and there is supervening illegality according to the
foreign lex loci solutionis, Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention would allow application of the law of
the latter country if it were part of English law: supra n 23, 1248–49 (para 32–146).
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performance.258 This is true, but the comity argument is still present. In addition,
arguably the parties’ expectation in this situation is that the contract would not
be enforced as enforcement would expose the party who has to carry out that
particular performance to sanctions in the place of performance. Furthermore,
this reasoning would be in line with the draft Rome I Regulation. Under Article
8(3), courts are directed to have regard to the consequences of application or non-
application of the third country’s mandatory rules for the parties. Therefore, it is
suggested that a court should give effect to the law of the place of performance
whatever the governing law of the contract in cases of initial259 and supervening
illegality.260
2. Operation of the Public Policy of the Lex Loci Solutionis
In Lemenda Ltd v African Middle East Co,261 the parties entered into a contract
whereby the plaintiff would use his influence with members of the Qatar govern-
ment to procure the renewal of a supply contract between the defendant and the
national oil corporation of Qatar, which was controlled by the government of
Qatar. The governing law of the contract was English law. It was clear that
English contracts for the use of influence on public persons to obtain a benefit
for another person in return for a commission were against English public policy.
It was found that such contracts were also against the internal public policy of
Qatar. The contract was not enforced. The reasoning ran thus: the fact that the
contract was contrary to the public policy of Qatar, the place of performance,
could not, of itself, constitute a ground for non-enforcement of the contract.
However, the public policy of Qatar may be a relevant factor in considering
whether the contract ought not to be enforced under the operation of English
public policy. The moral principles at stake here were held to be not “so weighty
as to lead an English court to refuse to enforce an agreement regardless of the
country of performance and regardless of the attitude of that country to such a
practice”.262 Nevertheless, since the domestic public policy of England and the
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258 Cheshire and North, supra n 32, 602–03.
259 Foster [1929] 1 KB 470; Regazzoni [1958] AC 301.
260 Singaporean courts have not tended to draw a distinction between Ralli Bros and Foster: Abdul
Shukor v Hood Mohamed [1968] 1 MLJ 258; Overseas Union Bank Ltd v Chua Kok Kay [1993] 1 SLR
686, 696 and 697. See D Chong, “Contractual Illegality and Conflict of Laws” (1995) 7 Singapore
Academy of Law Journal 303, 343–44. Furthermore, section 9(10) of the Australian Choice of Law
Bill applies regardless of the proper law of the contract and no distinction is made between
existing and supervening illegality: ALRC, Choice of Law (Report No 58), supra n 156, 86–87 (paras
8.16–17). Cf s 202(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws where the effect of supervening
or existing illegality according to the law of the place of performance is to be determined by the
applicable law of the contract (comment c).
261 [1988] QB 448 (hereafter “Lemenda”).
262 Ibid, 461. One would assume that if the contract was one of actual bribery, it would have been
void as being against the head of English public policy covering laws repugnant to English
principles of morality. See AG for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324, 330, per Lord Templeman:
“Bribery is an evil practice which threatens the foundations of any civilised society.”
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public policy of Qatar coincided on this point, the contract was not enforceable.
The rationale of the case is that:
“[T]he English courts should not enforce an English law contract which falls to be
performed abroad where: (i) it relates to an adventure which is contrary to a head of
English public policy which is founded on general principles of morality, and (ii) the
same public policy applied to the country of performance so that the agreement would
not be enforceable under the law of that country.”263
Was English public policy there functioning as the public policy of the forum
or of the proper law? This is a difficult question in which it may not be sensible
to draw a line as the fact that English law was both the lex fori and the governing
law of the contract must surely have had an impact on the decision. Indeed,
Phillips J observed that in this particular situation, “international comity com-
bines with English domestic public policy to militate against enforcement”.264
This suggests that the decision in Lemenda was a combination of two factors: the
role of the forum in preserving comity to take account of the fact that perfor-
mance was against the public policy of the lex loci solutionis, and domestic public
policy, in play because English was the governing law of the contract, that took
the same view as the place of performance.265
What if the governing law of the contract was not English law but, say,
Ruritanian law, under which the contract was perfectly valid but which was
against the public policy of the place of performance, say, Utopia, and also
against the public policy of England? Would English public policy then step in to
strike down the contract?
Some guidance on this question may be derived from a case concerning the
enforcement of an arbitral award.266 In Westacre Investments v Jugoimport-SDPR
Holding Co Ltd,267 Waller LJ took the view that if performance is contrary to the
domestic public policy of the place of performance, enforcement should be
allowed so long as it is not contrary to the domestic public policy of the proper
law and/or the curial law.268 His Lordship also stated that:
66 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
263 Lemenda, supra n 261, 461.
264 Ibid, 461.
265 If this conclusion is correct, this means that this particular fact situation could be dealt with under
the Rome Convention either on the basis that it is a rule of English law as the applicable law of
the contract that the contract is void under Article 8(1) or unenforceable under Article 10(1)(b), or
alternatively, that this falls under forum public policy under Article 16.
266 Any argument that this renders the case (and other enforcement of arbitral award cases
considered) irrelevant in this section must be pre-empted by pointing out that the illegality
tainting the underlying contract is still significant. “Where public policy is involved, the inter-
position of an arbitration award does not isolate the successful party’s claim from the illegality
which gave rise to it”: Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] 3 WLR 811, 823, per Waller LJ.
267 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 65 (hereafter “Westacre”). The case concerned enforcement of an arbitral
award made upon a contract for the purchase of personal influence.
268 Westacre [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 65, 74.
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“It is legitimate to conclude that there is nothing which offends English public policy if
an arbitral tribunal enforces a contract which does not offend the domestic public
policy under either the proper law of the contract or its curial law, even if English
domestic public policy might have taken a different view.”269
This suggests that a contract which is against the domestic public policy of the
place of performance (Utopia) and the forum (England) but valid according to
the governing law of the contract (Ruritanian law) should be enforced. This view
seems in principle correct if the place of performance itself only considers the
disputed performance something which is merely within its domestic public
policy.
The next question then is: what if, regardless of the views of the forum or
governing law of the contract, the contract is against the international public
policy of the place of performance? Could one argue, by analogy with cases like
Foster v Driscoll and Regazzoni v KC Sethia,270 that if the place of performance is a
friendly and foreign state, the forum should apply the public policy of the place
of performance? The answer depends on whether there should be a difference in
the treatment meted out to the public policy of the third country in comparison
with its mandatory rules.
3. Should There Be a Distinction Between Application of the
Mandatory Rules and Public Policy of the Lex Loci Solutionis?
Foster and Regazzoni involved application of the third country’s mandatory rules.
Zhilsov argues that public policy is “a set of normative principles underlying a
particular legal system” whereas mandatory rules forward “a concrete interest,
or policy, which does not necessarily reflect . . . broad public policy principles”.271
Therein lies the difficulty of attempting to treat public policy in the same manner
as mandatory rules. Public policy varies and fluctuates depending on the
changing values of society and circumstances of the time.272 Furthermore, no real
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269 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 65, 75. Additionally, his Lordship analysed Lemenda and this statement shows
that his Lordship interpreted that English public policy was operating as forum public policy in
Lemenda.
270 See also Soleimany v Soleimany which involved a contract requiring the parties to smuggle carpets
out of Iran in contravention of Iranian revenue and export controls. It was stated that an English
court will not “enforce a contract governed by the law of a foreign and friendly state, or which
requires performance in such a country, if performance is illegal by the law of that country”:
[1998] 3 WLR 811, 827. Cf Omnium de traitement et de Valorisation v Hilmarton [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
222.
271 Zhilsov, supra n 13, 101. Although, as Zhilsov goes on to observe, at 102, any mandatory rule may
be understood as giving effect to a more general principle of public policy if one takes a broad
construction of the rule. See supra, section B, for a discussion of the two concepts of public policy
and mandatory rules.
272 Naylor, Benzon & Co v Krainische Industrie Gesellschaft [1918] 1 KB 331, 342; van Duyn v Home Office
Case 41/74 [1974] ECR 1337, para 18; P Molife and H Yu, “The Impact of National Law
Elements on International Commercial Arbitration” (2001) 4 International Arbitration Law Review17,
19; Chong, supra n 260, 324.
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“scale of values” as to what is condemned as being against public policy can be
discerned.273 Given the tenuous and discretionary nature of public policy, it
would often be difficult for an English court to gauge whether a foreign court
when faced with the same facts would have elected to exercise its discretion to
cite its public policy to disapply a particular rule of law. Whereas mandatory
rules are of course non-discretionary in nature; therefore, an English court would
be confident that the foreign court would have followed a particular course when
breach of a mandatory rule occurs.
Quite apart from the practical difficulties involved, there is also a conceptual
objection to a court applying another country’s public policy. Nygh claims that
“there is agreement among civil and common lawyers that the forum will not
enforce the public policy of third States”.274 One of the reasons that led to the
German reservation against Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention was that the
provision would have led to the enforcement of foreign ordre public, “which was
considered unacceptable”.275 This refusal to enforce the public policy of another
country appears to based on notions of forum sovereignty, that is, that the forum
should not have to enforce anyone else’s public policy but its own.
This analysis, that there should be a distinction between acts which infringe
the public policy of a third country and acts which violate written provisions of
the third country, is supported by case law. Phillips J in Lemenda Trading recog-
nised the distinction, although unfortunately he did not go on to elaborate on the
matter.276 In Shaikh Faisal v Swan Hunter, Chao J noted that cases like Ralli and
Regazzoni specifically related to infringements of the written laws of foreign coun-
tries.277 The difference in status between foreign public policy and foreign
mandatory rules is also bourne out by In re Missouri Steamship Company278 where
the third country involved was the place where the contract was concluded.279
This case involved a contract, made in Massachusetts, for the transport of cattle
from Boston to England in a British ship between an American and a British
company. The contract contained a clause excusing the British company for
negligence of the master or crew of the ship. English law was the governing law
of the contract and the clause was valid by English law but was against public
68 Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries Vol. 2 No. 1
273 Kahn-Freund, supra n 13, 254 (footnote references omitted): “courts have condemned, as being
against public policy foreign contracts in restraint of trade, but not contracts for usurious
loans . . . : champertous contracts, but not loans given for gambling; the French laws on guardian-
ship over prodigals and the Maltese law on the maintenance of illegitimate children, but not a
claim for the conversion of slaves on the high seas or for the breach of a Brazilian contract for the
sale of slaves.”
274 Nygh, supra n 25, 207. See also Reynolds, supra n 48, 373–74.
275 Max-Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, supra n 4, 71.
276 [1988] QB 448, 456.
277 [1995] 1 SLR 394, 414 (emphasis added).
278 (1888) 42 ChD 321.
279 At the time of the case, it was assumed that where a contract is made in one country to be
performed in another, prima facie the governing law of the contract is the lex loci contractus in the
absence of other factors: (1888) 42 ChD 321, 338, 340–41.
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policy by the law of Massachusetts. Since the clause did not violate “positive
law”,280 the Court of Appeal ignored the public policy of Massachusetts and
upheld the clause.281 In addition, it is significant that although the Rome Con-
vention provides for application of a third country’s mandatory rules,282 it does
not provide for application of a third country’s public policy.
Thus, from all the above, it can be concluded that the public policy of a third
country holds less sway than its mandatory rules. First, if England is the forum
and English law is the governing law of the contract, the domestic public policy
of the lex loci solutionis is only taken into account if it coincides with English
domestic public policy. Secondly, if the governing law of the contract is that of
another country, an English court will not take into account the domestic public
policy of the lex loci solutionis. Thirdly, there are practical and conceptual justifica-
tions not to enforce the international public policy of the lex loci solutionis. Judicial
dicta and the lack of a provision catering for a third country’s public policy in the
Rome Convention would appear to support this proposition.
The only exception to the above would be where the public policy of the lex
loci solutionis reflects conceptions of international morality.283 One would assume,
however, that in this situation, English law would also consider the contract to be
against its public policy and therefore render the contract void or unenforceable
as being against forum public policy.284
4. Derivation of General Principles Concerning the Application of
the Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries from
Case Law Involving the Lex Loci Solutionis
Of all potentially applicable laws of third countries, it is well established that
the lex loci solutionis has a legitimate interest in being applied to an international
contract.285 It is submitted that the approach taken towards the lex loci solutionis
shows how the law of a third country should be given effect. Which third country
would be considered to have the requisite “close connection” such that it is
considered to have a legitimate interest in the contract would depend on the facts
of the particular case. However, once the third country has been identified, it is
possible to derive general principles from the common law cases discussed above
which could guide courts in the exercise of their discretion directly to apply this
country’s laws.
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280 See (1888) 42 ChD 321, 336, 339 and 342.
281 In Mark v Mark [2005] UKHL 42, [2006] 1 AC 98, 105 (para 11), Lord Hope stated: “our courts
do not apply the public policy of a foreign state”.
282 Article 7(1).
283 Reynolds, supra n 48, 378–79; Molife and Yu, supra n 272, 20. See J Dolinger, “World Public
Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” (1982) 17 Texas International Law
Journal 167, for a conception of a “world public order”.
284 Article 16 of the Rome Convention.
285 Giuliano–Lagarde Report, supra n 32, 27.
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Subject to future interpretation of the Rome I Regulation by the European
Court of Justice, it is suggested that the following guidelines apply:
1. Application of mandatory rules should not depend on whether the rules
came into effect prior to, or after the contract was concluded.
2. Generally, a court does not apply the public policy of another country.
However, as qualifications to proposition 2:
3. If England provides both the forum and governing law of the contract,
the court will not enforce a contract which offends both English domestic
public policy and the domestic public policy of the third country.
4. If the contract is against both the domestic public policies of England
and the third country but is valid according to the public policy of the
governing law of the contract, the latter prevails.
5. If the public policy of the third country reflects international conceptions
of morality, it should be given effect.
E. CONCLUSION
The issue of the role that should be accorded to the public policy and mandatory
rules of third countries can be broken down into two questions. First, should the
courts have the discretion to apply the laws of a third country; and if yes,
secondly, how that discretion should be exercised. It has been shown that strong
grounds of principle exist for giving effect to a third country’s laws and that
direct application, as opposed to indirect application, is the preferable mode of
application. As to the question of how the discretion should be exercised, specific
guidelines as to direct applicability can be found under Article 8(3) of the
proposed Rome I Regulation. This provision adopts a position similar to the
American interests analysis doctrine whereby the focus is on the nature and
objective of the rule. Article 8(3) also gives primacy to parties’ legitimate expecta-
tions. In addition, further guidelines can be found in the common law English
cases concerning the lex loci solutionis. The analysis of this area of the law has
revealed principles of general application that could guide courts and inform
party expectations as to the operation of the discretion. The analysis has in
particular revealed that the public policy of a third country plays a more subsid-
iary role compared to its mandatory rules.
As far as the proposed Rome I Regulation is concerned, it is probable that
objections will be raised against the draft Article 8(3), as happened for Article
7(1) of the Rome Convention. It is hoped that this article has shown that Article
8(3) should instead be seen as a welcome development. English law has long
admitted that the law of a third country should be given effect indirectly. It is
now time to take the next step and embrace direct applicability.
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